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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of Japan's strategic
resource dependence and her reliance of the three raw
materials-rich regions of Southeast Asia (ASEAN), the Persian
Gulf, and Southern Africa. A discussion of the Japanese for-
mula for securing resources in the less developed countries
of the "South" is included along with a brief overview of her
onshore resource utilization in business /industry . The roles
of direct foreign investment, official development assistance,
energy conservation, and Japanese mult inationalizat ion are
discussed.
Each resource supplying region is examined and supported
with current tables and figures concerning bilateral/multi-
lateral relations with Japan, emphasizing the post-1973
timeframe. The Nuechterlein national interest matrix is
applied to Japan's resource dependence and analyzed with
postulated scenarios. A brief assessment of Japan's current
economic position is included along with the concluding
remarks.
It is the writer's opinion that Japan, though inescapably
dependent on overseas sourcing for over 80 percent of her raw
materials, has woven an effective web of economic interdepen-
dence with these three regions and is rapidly learning to cope
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"The paradox of Japan, thirty-five years after it was
left shattered and desolated by the Second World War, is
that its swift emergence as an economic superpower has so
overwhelmed it with plenty that it is not unlike some
heir to sudden huge wealth who, rather than feeling
elated, is embarassed, bewildered, and somewhat lonely as
he tries to adjust to the shock of affluence."
(Robert Shaplen)
There is no denying the fact that Japan's postwar
diplomacy has been the "diplomacy of the economy, by the
economy, and for the economy" with the nation's basic
strategy lying clearly in the concept of "seikei burni": a
distinct separation of politics, economics and culture. The
Japanese have maintained their own style for dealing with
everything, old and new, in tribal fashion, through
conformity and loyalty, and only rarely on the basis of
individual action and expression. In an Oriental societal
climate based on consensus, competition is countenanced only
if standards are established and respected: the ideal of
vertical responsibility — to goals of the family, the
company, and the nation — takes precedence over
individualism. The postwar economic void was filled with an
American-style materialistic model adapted to the Japanese
climate. Foreign trade grew to dominate economic diplomacy
as trading companies and a multiplicity of entrepreneurs,
encouraged by the government and supported by an ever higher
rate of productivity in such fields as steel, automobiles,
pertochemicals, electronics, and shipping, swarmed around the

world signing export contracts and building up huge balances
of trade in Japan's favor. All of this dismayed not only
other industrial nations but developing ones as well, which
legitmately think in terras of aid and ivestment to build up
their own economic base rather than of themselves as
constituting sources of more and more raw materials for
Ninon's factories. Little wonder Japan acquired early-on a
reputation as an ugly duckling — this "Resource Diplomacy"
complemented the unpleasant memories of the prewar "Greater
East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere."
But recently, despite a continued dependence on overseas
raw materials, Japan has proven itself to be more capable than
others of contending with economic crises brought on by oil
shocks and world recession: Japan has become envied and
admired for its accomplishments and resilience; "the ugly
duckling has engendered swan-like qualities" [Ref.l:p. 124].
Whether from the East or West / North or South, Japan's
dramatic progress during the past two decades is most often
praised and emulated throughout economic circles around the
globe. The world is indeed puzzled by this paradox: a country
of 117 million living on an archipelago poor in natural
resources ... on a land only 17% of which is arable . . . which
was deeply mired in feudalism 150 years ago . . . has come forth
to establish the free worlds second strongest economy ... 3%
of the worlds population ... living on .3% of the globe ...
10

producing 10% of the worlds gross national product [Ref.2:p.
43] .
The subject of Japan's resource dependency allows perhaps
the most prolific case study of any nation today. It reveals
the double-edged sword of affluence: real self-interest
required that Japan actively support the health of its major
markets in Europe and America and invest heavily on a global
scale in the development of new raw material sources.
A question frequently surfacing in the 1980s has been "Can
Japan continue this progress and growth level ad infinitum?
Or will Japan be forced to restructure its way of life toward
economic objectives and try to obtain them through political,
diplomatic, and cultural channels?" A study of whether or not
the trillion-and-a-quarter dollar Japanese economy will
achieve continued growth throughout the rest of this decade is
beyond the scope of this study. However, a statistical and
conceptual evaluation of recent years' strategic resource
policy will provide sufficient background against which can be
measured the relative validity of statements/forecasts that
currently proliferate economic policy circles. Tables are
provided for the reader to examine and use for inductive
reasoning. The conceptual framework for the study of Japan's
resource dependency and her foreign economic policy dictates
that one search for linkages, causal relationships, and
important variables. If these linkages are found to be
applicable to other situations, they may contribute to an
11

enhanced understanding of the variables themselves. By
concentrating on three resource rich global regions (Southeast
Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Southern Africa) a diverse case
study relationship can be established and policy comparisons/
conslusions can be made.
12

II. BACKGROUND: JAPAN AND RESOURCES
A. DEPENDENCE PERSONIFIED
Raw materials such as oil, iron ore, copper, aluminum,
chromium, rubber, and many others are the lifeblood of modern
industry. Most of these commodities occur in the form of
minerals or natural resources in practically every part of the
world. In practice, however, deposits that are economically
exploitable with current technology exist in only a few
regions of the world. Moreover, many of the highly
industrialized countries that are primary consumers of raw
materials do not possess sufficient deposits of these
necessary minerals. Japan is perhaps the best example of an
economy with rapidly growing needs that must rely almost
entirely on the imports of most of its raw materials (Table
I).
When basic industries of a country become significantly
dependent on supplies of such raw materials from foreign
sources, these resources become labled strategically important
to the economies of those countries. Not all raw materials
are of equal importance to each nation; even when a particular
mineral is critical to one industry, it may not be of
importance to another unless it in turn depends on production
linkage output. As a result, the definition of what is truly
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country but also among industries within each nation. In
addition, if there exists the possibility of a severe shortage
or outright supply disruption of material that cannot be
readily substituted in an industry, then it must be considered
as strategic or critical to the end-users.
B. ACCESS
Among the almost 200 countries of the world there are
three basic groups of nations that have differing vital
interests in the supply and consumption of raw materials: the
industrialized free market economies (led by Japan, the EEC,
and the United States), the centrally planned economies
(dominated by the Soviet Union and PRO, and the developing
countries of the Third World (led in the 1970s by OPEC). The
industrialized economies account for 70% of global consumption
of raw materials yet own only about a third of the worlds
reserves (Table II); as a result, access to sources of raw
materials and a secure means of transportation to the
end-users is of paramount importance to the industrialized
free market economies.
Several factors influence the supply and consumption
of various raw materials in any particular country. Included
are the existence of onshore mineral deposits, availability of
capital and technology, energy supplies, tranportat ion system,
industrial demand, and export potential. Historically the USA
and the nations of the European Community (EC) have secured




















Figure 1.1 Comparative raw materials resources, production, and consumption in three
basic groups of nations in the world. Source. Based on estimates in the article "Crisis in
Mineral Resources" in SEMA Review published by Metra Consulting in Paris, France,
September 7, 1979. »
Source: Japan ' 81 (JETRO)
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captive development with vertical integration: that is, a
corporation obtains a large area of deposits as a concession
and undertakes exploration, development, and production
through wholly owned subsidaries. Not only upstream
operations but also downstream ones such as transportation
processing, distribution, and sales throughout the world are
integrated. This method has been quite efficient and
profitable for a number of western MNC ' s (multi-national
corporations); oligopolistic domination of worldwide sourcing
and sales has resulted [ Ref. 3: p. 507].
Japan's case is quite different. Until the 1960s, her
resource requirements were satisfied almost exclusively
through spot market purchase. But rapid modernization brought
heavy industrialization and created commensurate demands on
resource access/procurement. Quantum leaps in iron and steel,
aluminum, and petrochemical industries fueled the need for
increasing energy resources and other critical materials.
Japan's primary concern rapidly became the assurance adequate
quantities for downstream operations at reasonable prices and
without fear of delivery interruptions: No small task in the
turbulent decades of the 1960s/1970s! A two pronged attack
was developed and has proven to be effective for Japanese
interests: long-term contracts and technology/development in
exchange for trade. Long-term contracts have reduced host
nation concerns for "raw material prostitution" (rape of the
South) while development guarantees have improved the host's
17

productivity levels with technological, financial, and broad-
based economic assistance by the Japanese. A more detailed
regional case study emphasizing this Japanese international
business model will be made concentrating on three mineral
rich areas of the globe: Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf,
and Southern Africa.
C. RESOURCE UTILIZATION IN JAPAN
Over 70% of the total value of the world's production
of the top 50 most critical minerals is represented by energy
resources (oil, gas, coal): The availabilty of adequate
energy supplies is of great significance to the minerals and
metals production cycle— it is indispensible in exploration,
mining, processing, refining, and transportation of raw
materials. Several of the metallic minerals are produced in
great quantities in the form of ores: iron, copper, aluminum,
nickel, tin, lead, and zinc. Since World War II the
introduction of many new materials has created a high
technology resource industry in which energy, electronics, and
advanced systems fields have come to rely on; these materials
are often obscured under the label of "nonferrous metals" and
include: gold, cobalt, magnesium, platinum, silver, titanium,
uranium, in addition to the "exotics" such as columbium,
vanadium, and others.
During the 1970s about 50% of the Japanese import bill
was made up of raw materials to fuel the advanced minerals
processing industries that have been established there since
18

World War II [Ref. 4: p. 538], Some of the largest and most
modern refineries, smelters, and processing plants in the
world are located on Honshu. A brief commodity review will
allow investigation of Japan's utilization of resources and
possibly assist later analysis of her continued vulnerability
to offshore/overseas dependence.*
1. Metals/Non Fuel Minerals
a. Aluminum
The use of aluminum in the world now exceeds the
use of any other metal except iron. Construction, transporta-
tion, electrical and telecommunications industries are the
largest consumers of aluminum in Japan. Now the worlds third
largest producer (behind USA, USSR), Japan's production
quadrupled between 1965-1975 but was severely affected by the
first oil shock in 1973. Current plans are to continue a
phased 25-35% reduction in onshore production capacity
(dictated in 1978) to maintain a bauxite import level of
approximately 5 million tons annually.
b. Copper
Japan's copper production accounts for 6% of the
value of all minerals produced in the world. It is
indispensible for use in electric power transmission,
communications, motors, and thousands of other industry-wide
Statistics for the resource section are from the
Minerals Yearbook [Ref. 4], The White Papers of Japan [Ref. 5],
and Japan ' 81 [Ref. 6],
19

businesses. Japan's high growth rate in the 1970s was
instrumental in sustaining the world's copper market. Though
copper business has suffered from sluggish demand, price
fluctuations, and reduced profits during recent years, the
life expectancy of existing onshore custom smelters provides
assured requirements for concentrated ore imports for the
balance of this decade (about 2.8 million tons/year).
c. Iron and steel
Iron ore is the primary source material of the
iron and steel business, the backbone to any manufacturing
system. Construction, shipbuilding, transportation,
agriculture, and almost every other industry is affected to
some extent by iron and steel production. Japan's large,
integrated, and modern industrial complex became the West's
largest producer of steel in 1980 (112 M tons). A consistent
world leader in exporting steel products, she maintained a
dominant-buyer relationship with a number of iron ore
producing nations (over 132 million tons imported in 1979).
d. Lead and Zinc
These two nonferrous metals are vital to Japan's
automobile industry (assembly-line die castings and nicad
batteries) in addition to having proven versitility in
galvanizing steel and as components in safety shielding for
the nuclear industry. Refined lead and zinc production
throughout the past decade has averaged a 3:1 / 4:1 ratio over
local mine production, thus creating an identifiable market
20

that has sustained an import dependency of 70-75%.
Environmental concerns and land utilization has encouraged the
movement toward offshore ventures in this industry during the
last five years.
e. Nickel
One of the most versatile alloying materials,
nickel is used in the production of stainless steel and
corrosion resistent superalloys; it can be the most important
component in electronic gear due to its heat resistent
properties. Japan's demand for nickel stems from its
substantial smelting/refining infrastructure which produces in
excess of 130,000 tons annually and consistently ranks in the




For many industrial tasks, there are no
substitutes for tin; one third of all containers produced in
the world are tin. In addition, bronze, brass, ceramics, and
miscellaneous chemicals are dependent on tin. Japan has been
the world's second largest tin consumer for many years. The
abundance of worlds supplies in the Pacific Basin has
benefitted Japanese industry and allowed consistent
consumption in excess of 30,000 tons/year.
g. Titanium
During the time period 1975-1980, Japan
significantly increased its production of titanium sponge — a
major ingredient in the aerospace industry; there currently
21

are only four countries in the world producing this sponge
(UK/USA/JA/USSR) . About 50% of Japanese production is
exported to America and resultant titanium ore imports have
averaged 500,000 tons/annually.
h. High Technology Materials
Many new materials have been introduced to develop
advanced technology industries that make up a great part of
Japan's bright economic future in the 1980s. Electronics,
microwaves, lasers, cryogenics, and other similar programs
depend on newer "exotic materials" that are relatively unknown
commodities due to small production/extraction programs. Over
30 different metals can be identified with the high-technology
business and it is not by accident that Japan has become a
leader in producing/consuming such materials as bismuth,
columbium, germainuim, cadmium, zirconium, selenium,
tellurium, indium, and cobalt.
i. Manganese
Almost all imported maganese went to the iron and
steel industry where it was utilized as an ingredient in an
alloy for high quality, high tensile strength steel. The
Japanese are developing deep seafloor exploration/mining
equipment to pursue Pacific seabed harvesting of manganese
nodules in attempt to reduce their dependence on imports.
j. Precious Metals
1) Gold is utilized in integrated electronic
circuits for solid state devices. In addition, 50% of the
22

gold processed in Japan is held by the government for monetary
reserves.
2) Silver has diverse uses but is the most
common in electronics and the booming photography industries
in Japan. One third of the domestic amount needed for
industry was produced in Japan as a by-product of copper,
lead, and zinc processing.
3) The platinum metals consist of platinum,
palladium, iridium, rhodium, ruthenium, and osmium and are
rare, anticorrosive alloys utilized in petroleum refining and
the automobile industry. These are used in small quantities
when compared to other critical materials but when utilized,
there are no practical existing substitutes. Japanese
industrial demand is a very strong influence in this metal
group and normally accounts for up to 50% of the worlds
consumption.
k. Molybdenum and Tungsten
These two metals are utilized in the steel
industry as an alloying element to produce high tensile, wear
resistent, temperature treated steels for special uses. The
1970s saw wild fluctuations in the market price for these
commodities with a quadrupuling of unit value between
1973-1976. Industry demand has kept imports of these two




Another alloy important to aluminum and special
use steel production, chromite ore has continued to remain
important to Japanese heavy industry, especially in the
automobile and aviation business. Import levels are expected
to exceed the 4 million tons figure for the forseeable future.
2. Energy Resources
Japan is one of the most significant energy
"have-nots" of the 20th century. With a total reliance of 86%
of its 1980 energy requirements coming from foreign sources,
the bulk of the country's import bill throughout the 1970s has
been dedicated to petroleum, coal, liquefied natural /petroleum
gas, natural gas, and uranium. To meet the country's energy
needs, virtually all forms of mineral fuels were imported to
sustain Japan's industries.
a. Coal
The rapid growth of the Japanese steel industry
has fueled increased development of the coal business in a
number of countries. Due to perfected technology in
cokemaking (in order to maximize blast furnace productivity)
the Japanese have become dependent on a supply of high
quality, low volitile coals from a limited number of sources.
In addition, the encouraged diversification in the electric
power industry away from crude/fuel oil has significantly
raised thermal coal imports. A lack of domestic supply has
24

pushed the coal import total over the 50 million ton per year
mark for the last ten years.
b. Uranium
The energy diversification plan dictated by the
first oil shock laid out specific growth plans for the nuclear
power industry. To achieve a 25% share of energy generated by
the end of the century, Japanese reactors need to continue the
progressive growth pattern achieved in the last 15 years.
This will include a sustained dependency on uranium ore
imports, mostly from the African continent, which are needed
to fuel the pressurized water, fast-breeder and advanced
thermal reactors that Japan has on-line.
c. Gas
The third pillar of the three tiered "alternate
energy equation" for Japan is the recent increasing interest
in converting the source for much of the industrial electric
power to liquefied natural gas; gas powered thermal plants
will provide over one third of Japan's electricity in 1983.
The 1980 demand of 16 million imported tons of LNG is expected
to increase throughout the decade.
d. Petroleum
10% of the world's energy is consumed by Japan;
75% of this Japanese energy is fueled by imported crude oil.
Despite an impressive conservation and energy diversification
campaign, her oil bill exceeds $70 billion annually and will
25

continue to push the 6 million barrels/day total that the 99%
import reliance equated to in 1980.
D. RESOURCE OVERVIEW
Japan was one of the first nations to recover from the
worldwide economic slump in the aftermath of the 1974 oil
crisis. Her surpluses in trade and current accounts have
continued to rise annually from the 1974 level. A critically
important consumer of raw materials and producer of finished
products, her mineral imports bill continues to account for
more than 60% of her imports bill (Table III).
Processing raw materials has provided a base for high
economic growth and for re-export of higher processed
products. Growing concern for energy opposition to land/water
resource use for heavy industry during the 1970s brought
pressure for a shift in Japan's industrial structure. The
successful implementation of some of these new policies, a
regional examinination of three resource-rich areas of the
globe on which Japan relies for a major percentage of her raw
materials and a discussion of Japanese foreign economic policy
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III. JAPAN'S ANSWER TO THE CHALLENGE
"The societies which have achieved the most
spectacular broad-based economic progress in the shortest
period of time are not the most tightly controlled, not
necessarily the biggest in size, or the wealthiest in
natural resources. No, what unites them all is their
willingness to believe in the magic of the marketplace."
(President Ronald Reagan, IMF address, 9/29/81)
Japan's dependence on imports of raw materials and
energy is so complete that policies attempting
self-sufficiency in any of the key items in Table I appear
unrealistic. Indeed, the long-term goals established for
Japanese industry /manufacturing are diversification of source
of supply, economizing on raw material use, stepping up local
production from indigenous resources, and establishing a
national stockpile program for emergencies. But the basic
character of heavy dependence on offshore sourcing will not
change.
A. BACKGROUND OF MATERIALS PROCUREMENT STRATEGY
Throughout most of the 1950s/1960s Japan procured her raw
materials directly from sources — via direct deal or open
purchase on the spot market. In most mineral industries, the
barriers to participation/ joint investment were too high for
indigenous industries to overcome. But world market
conditions were condusive to obtaining favorable terms and
28

Japan obtained the necessary materials to fuel her growing
industrial demand.
But the early 1970s brought some severe "shocks" to
Japan's modus operendi — the Bretton Woods collapse, the
soybean export threat and the dollar devaluation by America,
and most importantly, the 1973/74 oil crisis. Those events
dealt a fatal blow to the assumption implicit in her past
strategy that resources would always be readily available at
low cost. As a result of these developments, by the mid 1970s
the environment in which Japanese industries operated had
changed drastically, forcing them to alter general operations
in two important ways: First, Japan's enterprises became
increasingly interested in promoting their own resource
exploration and development. The obvious result was a
significant increase in the number of Japanese-owned,
overseas ventures dealing in aluminum, copper, iron ore,
petroleum, and other resources. Second, these industries
plunged into the establishment of manufacturing facilities
abroad, some designed primarily to defend their export
market, others to gain access to low-cost labor. In addition,
Japanese firms stepped up efforts to gain favored access to
advanced technology, low-cost energy, and suitable plant
sites.
These two modifications in Japanese foreign economic
behavior brought three additional business phenomena into
being: a. a marked increase in Japanese direct investment
29

overseas, b. the solidification of the long-term contracts
for securing resources offshore, and, c. the proliferation of
dominant-buyer relationships as a facet of these contracts.
B. DIRECT INVESTMENT, JAPANESE STYLE
Direct foreign investment, that is, the transmission to
the host country of a package of capital, managerial skill,
and technical knowledge, is a potent agent of economic
transformation and development [Ref.5: p. 77], Japan has
endeavored to invest in developing countries with the object
of securing increased imports of primary products which are
vitally important for her economy. This is called
"development assistance for import" and generally referred to
as "trade oriented investment." It is aimed at complementing
Japan's comparative advantage position while reducing her
areas of disadvantage. An examination of her DFI (direct
foreign investment) made by Kiyoshi Kojima in 1980 indicated
that three distinct lines were evident [Ref.6: p. 631]:
1. DFI in natural resources development accounted
for 23.9 percent of the total amount with mining being the
most important source.
2. Manufacturing accounted for 32.4 percent of the
total with metals and appliances assuming the bulk investment
percentage.
3. DFI in commerce represented 43.5 percent and
included banks, trading companies, insurance and shipping
30

companies — all of which work in facilitating external trade
(Table IV).
Geographically, Japanese DFI was weighted heavily toward
the "South" with LDC ' s receiving over 54 percent of total
overseas investment (for the regions in this study: 27% Asia,
6% in the Gulf, and 4% in Southern Africa). More importantly,
the trend throughout the 1970s has been for remarkable
growth: from a 1971 total cumulative investment overseas of
4.4 billion dollars to a 1980 figure of over 36.5 billion
dollars! (Table V). Due to the severe recession after the
first oil crisis, Japanese DFI sank in real terms but
recovered rapidly along with the economy and by FY77
adjustments were made and overseas assets rose dramatically.
The 1978 record outlay of 4.6 billion dollars represented a
64 percent increase and continued higher in 1979 to a new
peak of $4.9 billion. A number of factors dictated this
overseas investment surge:
1. Japanese enterprises focused on outward
investment as part of their long-term business strategy to
devlop foreign markets once the oil-induced business slump
receded.
2. The yen appreciated in 1978 lowering the relative
cost of DFI and encouraging export-intensive industries
investment
.
3. Japanese business began to increase their
overseas branch subsidiaries to blunt LDC criticisms of
the dominant foreign MNC.
4. Plant exports were sought to increase local
labor-intensive employment in manufacturing.
5. Wage differentials between Japan and the OECD
diminished resulting in a reduced comparative labor
advantage
.
6. Resource shortages prompted DFI in raw-material
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Tota 1 23,948 36,497
Source: Ministry of Finance
33

for 64 percent of Japan's cumulative total in this sector.
[Ref. 7.]
Profits from this upsurge in DFI have been unable to
offset the total outflow so far, thus contributing to the
overall deficit in Japan's international basic balance. But
one of the most often cited indirect benefits of overseas
investment is its inherent contribution to the recipient
nation in the devlopment arena: capital, technology, and
human resources. As of the end of FY79, Japanese enterprises
abroad employed 700,000 local employees contributing to 4
percent of the total assets of foreign corporations and 4^
percent of aggregate sales (MOF)
.
In the developing countries, the investment environment in
resource/energy fields presents difficulties, but as it is
essential to assure future supplies, Japan will continue to
mitigate risks by providing government backed insurance and
investment protection to her overseas entrepreneurs.
C. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
Japan has promoted economic development arrangements
leading to trade for virtually all raw materials. Development
for trade means offshore sourcing through low levels of
trade-oriented DFI [Ref. 8: p. 79]. Japan participates to some
extent in the development and improvement of productivity of
primary product extraction with technological, financial, and
sometimes broad economic assistance in order to import these
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products. Financing is limited, usually taking the form of
developmental loans, but assurance of the large home market in
Japan through various forms of long-terra contracts, has
worked a significant role. Specific contractual patterns
follow the same lines from country to country, commodity to
commodity; generally included are:
1. A 10-15 year quality deliverance guarantee
2. A 10% base tonnage quantity margin
3. A fixed price for the quantity secured for a
certain number of years with the provision for price
re-negotiation at a later date, (but normally with an
agreed upon upper/lower limit window of 7£%).
The obvious benefits of the long-term contract involves
advantages for both supplier and receiver — the large-scale
trade improves development allowing economies of scale and
identifiable long-term capital gains for both parties. In
addition, in the transportation phase, due to the identified
market, specialized vessels can be utilized for the trade
allowing the most efficient use of shipping and reducing
freight costs. Other incidental transaction costs, contract
negotiations, customs clearance, carrier selection, and
settlement of payments are reduced because of
standardization
.
D. DOMINANT BUYER SITUATIONS C= 4o
Japan has undertaken a national policy of diversification
of supply for raw materials to avoid the "single-source
vulnerability" syndrome. But in certain minerals, the demand
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is so large, that a major portion of the suppliers' output
goes to Japan, i.e., non-ferrous metals found in ASEAN
(copper, lead, silver, bauxite). In this situation, Japan has
usually managed to establish a "dominant buyer-major supplier
relationship" based on the long-term contracts. When more
than 50 percent of a supplying country's total exports of a
material are to Japan (A=the ratio of exports to Japan),
Japan is the dominant buyer and may be able to exercise
monopoly bargaining power. When the share of Japan's imports
from a given country is greater than 50 percent (B=Japan*s
dependency on that country), the supplying country is the
dominant supplier and can manifest monopoly bargaining power.
The latter rarely occurs due to supplier diversification.
When the bargaining power index C (A divided by B) with a
country is above one, it means the Japanese position is
stronger in determining long-term contract rates, prices, and
terms; if the index is less than one, the reverse is true
[Ref.9: p. 514]. Specific commodity examples will be examined
in a later section of this study.
In addition to advancing Japan's own resource security,
the long-term contract approach has two possible advantages
for the stability of world trade in natural resources: The
pricing terms established by Japan and its suppliers set the
pace for the world market rate in many commodities; the
existence of this long-term contract price can serve to
stabilize short-term market fluctuations in the international
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arena. It can also introduce greater competition into the
management of future long-term contracts.
But the market triad approach employed by the Japanese
(direct investment, long-term contracts, dominant buyer
relationship) is not without problems. Japan's enormous
demand for resources is a great incentive, but alone is not
sufficient to ensure adequate overseas development -- capital,
technology, and active enterpreneurship are needed and this
usually meaans purchaser contract diversification by the
supplying nation (i.e., US, Canada, EEC, MNC's, or foreign
economic investment /loan assistance). In order to earn the
respect of the sovereign resource owner and retain its
long-term supply chain, Japan has increased its international
joint ventures, increased its ODA (government controlled
official development assistance), and has intensified its
overall conservation of resources campaign — a policy that
has resulted in a resounding success.
E. THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL
Japanese multinational enterprises are essentially a
product of the decade of the 1970s. They are late-comers and
have been forced to break into the "bigtime" by competing with
the well established western MNC. Breaking into this
oligopolic network has meant using overseas production to
maintain and expand their market share which was attained
originally by increasing exports from Japan. The most
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significant progress on this track has been registered in the
developing countries due to the LDC need for revenue/direct
investment. As noted earlier, the Japanese push for raw
materials logically dictated that investment, capital, and
participation be directed toward procuring offshore natural
resources to fuel the growing, resource-poor economy (hence,
the still correspondingly high percentage -31%- of Japanese
raw materials development ventures by its relatively young
enterprises overseas). Through postwar revamping of Meiji
Era trading companies which had been established by the
"Zaibatsu" (big business organizations) to ensure a supply of
raw materials from overseas, Japanese based multinationals
began to shift emphasis into large scale overseas projects
such as petroleum, aluminum, and steel plant operations.
Additional contributing factors mentioned by several authors
about this tentatively new and far reaching expansion of the
Japanese MNC included:
1. Onshore restrictions to growth in resource
processing industries due to environmental concerns, labor
costs, and energy use in Japan.
2. Nationalistic concerns voiced by resource
suppliers encouraging increased onshore development and
investment
.
3. The first and second "oil shocks " (1973/1979)
which forced Japan to examine her entire economic
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infrastructure and reevaluate the various options for future
growth.
4. And, as Tsuneo Iida describes it, "...simply that
the Japanese economy had finally arrived at a stage of
Japanese imperialisn or internationalization . . . " [Ref. 10:
p. 51]
For these reasons and a host of others, the Japanese
corporate interests abroad significantly increased in the
1970s as Japan emphasized the importance of her overseas
ivestments. To allow a more thorough understanding of the
growth pattern of a Japanese MNC in a resource industry, a
more detailed look will be presented in Appendix A by
outlining the exploits of Japanese oil companies in the last
25 years.
F. THE ROLE OF ODA
Japan's "resource constraints" problem did not originate
in any sense in an absolute raw materials depletion problem
created in the 1970s. It is more a product of the worsening
"North-South" dispute resulting from continued development of
resources in the LDC * s by Japan and other OECD* nations. The
1970s policy of increased direct investment overseas by major
*0ECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; formed 1961 by the major market nations of the
North: USA, JA, CAN, AUST, NZ , EEC.
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firms has complicated the search for secure supplies due to
the controversial "MNC exploitation"; the developing countries
are attempting to establish more permanent sovereignty over
their raw material resources/onshore devlopment projects.
Environmental and conservation concerns are rapidly coming to
the forefront as the LDC seeks to protect its treasure of raw
materials.
To meet this challenge the Japanese government has
proceeded with a two pronged economic attack — the first
being increased direct foreign investment by private concerns
(now in excess of 36 billion dollars of worldwide assets) and
the second being an active expansion of official development
assistance (ODA) directed toward the "South." A review of
Japan's foreign trade reveals that from 1976-80, some 45
percent of exports and 56 percent of her imports were
conducted with developing countries (compared to OECD averages
of 26 and 8 percent) (Table VI). In order to further the
MITI/JETRO policy of promoting welfare and assisting in the
economic development of the revenue-poor developing nations,
Japan has directed its bilateral economic aid toward natural
resource rich nations who need assistance building a stable
infrastructure. An effective policy has been supervised by
MITI linking the three elements of ODA, DFI , and bilateral
trade in response to the needs of both countries. Japan's
performance in the economic assistance field has realized a
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figure of $1.1 billion/ .23GNP to a 1980 total of $3.3 billion/
.32 GNP (Table VII/VIII). A 1980 Cabinet decision
acknowledging the UN requested goal of OECD/ODA flow at 0.7%
GNP has been described as "attainable by Japan in the 1980s.
"
In addition, the "grant element" inside this ODA program has
recently exceeded the 77% level, thus approaching the average
Development Assistance Committee (OECD) percentages in respect
to grant fund assistance (OECD average 1979: 89%).
A brief look at the Japanese ODA background is needed to
put this steadily rising, increasingly altruistic aid in
proper perspective. Until the 1973 oil shock, Japan's ODA/
foreign aid program amounted to less than .2% of its GNP. In
the aftermath of the oil crisis, MITI developed an economic
plan to reflect Japan's energy-short, rising cost-of-labor
,
pollution-conscious situation. The resulting "Long-Term
Vision" contemplated the restructuring of Japanese industry
by "giving away" to appropriate third-world LDC s Japan's
labor-intensive, energy-consuming, polluting heavy
industries; onshore industry would then be concentrated on
the high-technology, sophisticated, knowledge-intensive
industries. MITI contemplated that these industries would
produce against global, not domestic, demand bases and
effectively maximize the production cost advantages from
economies of scale [Ref.14]. This "Long-Term Vision" was
adopted and has been developing steadily over the past eight
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Industrializing Countries) in major plant construction (steel
mills, copper smelters, petro-chemical complexes) and
naturally has exported the machinery parts, technology and
the capital investment for these projects. Meanwhile, because
Japan has been "giving away" its raw material-intensive,
energy- consuming industries, the relative cost to Japanese
industry for imported raw materials has realized a decline in
real terms while the high-technology export business has
flourished. The resulting economic effect has been an ever-
increasing trade surplus in international trade. Hence, the
rising chorus of requests from the "South" for Japanese
monetary assistance and technical aid.
In response to pressures from her LDC trading partners
and OECD members (led by the EEC and USA) Japan announced a
policy calling for active expansion and improvement of
"economic cooperation" with the adoption of the New Economic
and Social Seven Year Plan in August 1979. A balanced
program of foreign grants, bilateral loans, multilateral aid,
and carefully directed technical assistance was introduced by
MITI/MOF/the Foreign Ministry. When examined with other OECD
members, Japan comes out fourth in absolute amount, twelfth
in GNP percentage, and in the middle-of-the-pack in grant
element terms. Japan's expanding foreign aid trend can best
be seen in the bilateral financial contributions column of
Table VIII: the 1979 jump to 1.9 billion dollars was financed
by the Japanese Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Economic
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Cooperation Fund and the Japan International Cooperation
Agency. The large increase in 1980 in multi-lateral
assistance reflected Japan's increased participation in the
international financial lending organizations, the World Bank
and the Manila based, Asian Development Bank (ADB). Japan is
the largest single donor to ADB, maintaining a 33% share for
1980/81/82 and also providing the president of this 43-
member organization, Taroichi Yoshida. Almost 50 percent of
Japan's 1981 ADB grant of $386 M went for infrastructure
projects including electric power generation, telecommuni-
cations, transportation, and water supply systems
construction [Ref.15],
The general picture of Japan's ODA indicates that while
there are several areas that should be improved (GNP %, grant
%), Japan has steadily been increasing its assistance despite
the world's stagnating economy and correspondingly austere
budgets in Tokyo. At the North-South summit in Cancun,
Mexico, Prime Minister Suzuki announced his government's plan
to double by 1985 the aggregate ODA figure attained in 1975-
1980 ($21 billion). In addition, the previous goal of
reaching a total ODA flow of 28 billion dollars in the "Seven
Year Plan" (1979-86) was projected [Ref.16]; by realizing a
doubling of the ODA allocation in the first three years of
the current Plan, the Japanese have attained the OECD average
of .32% GNP and will probably exceed this figure in 1982 with
a projected assistance budget of nearly 4.5 billion dollars.
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However, the UN imposed target of ODA flow at the .7% GNP
level will be harder to achieve due to the restrained growth
targets and stagnating world economy in the early 1980s.
G. THE ROLE OF ENERGY CONSERVATION
In order to lend further support for the market triad
approach (DEI, long-term contracts, dominant buyer
relationships) and demonstrate concern for the future of
global natural resources, Japan has developed and enforced
the most successful energy conservation program of any OECD
member.
Japan depends on oil to provide more than 80 percent of
its primary energy base, importing 99 percent of its crude
(approximately 3/4 of its 1978-80 supply needs came from the
Persian Gulf). The oil shocks of 1973/1979 which resulted in
a price-per-barrel escalation from $3 to $36 for Arabian
light rapidly increased Japan's crude oil tab to the 50
percentile level of her total import current accounts bill
(in excess of $70 billion in 1980). As staggering as this
figure may seem, the fact remains that without the imposition
of the strict medium and long-range energy conservation goals
instituted in the 1970s, Japan's vulnerability to energy
associated interruptions could have had more severe, perhaps
irreversible effects on their burgeoning industrial economy
..., i.e., a "lesser man would have collapsed" under the
pressure. But due to adherence to voluntary and legislated
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restrictions introduced by the "Law Concerning Promotion of
Development and Introduction of Petroleum-Substituting
Energy," the creation of the Energy Development Organiza-
tion, and diversified programs in research and development
(the Sunshine Project /Moonlight Program begun in 1974), the
Japanese ended the decade importing roughly the same amount
of crude oil as in 1975 (Table IX). MITI s conservation
program was directed primarily at industry, the user of 60
percent of overall domestic energy, and included financial
subsidies and tax benefits to companies utilizing energy-
saving technology and specific measures in the major
industries such as [Ref.17]:
1. Steel - The steel industry increasingly adopted
the continuous casting system for producing crude steel;
this allowed a two-thirds reduction in traditional energy
methods by recycling gas pressure from blast furnaces to
generate electricity. The result was a 9 percent saving
over a six year industry period; Nippon Steel itself saved
41 billion barrels of oil in 4 1/2 years.
2. Automobiles - improved control in steel forging
waste heat recovery during painting and improved
insulation resulted in a 21 percent reduction in
electricity and fuel bills between 1973-1978. In addition,
Japanese cars showed an 11 percent mileage improvement
during this period.
3. Cement - installation of suspension heaters for
the limestone kilns increased efficiency and reduced
energy consumption by 16 percent.
4. Aluminum - reduction in the amount of heavy oil
used in preheating together with other rational measures
resulted in a 6 percent drop in energy required between
1974-1978.
5. Other - electrical power stations increased
thermal efficiency getting more mileage out of the
oil/coal used. Chemical companies produced a 17 percent
reduction in fuel costs via new recovery techniques,
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Introduction of these and other innovative conservation
programs resulted in an OECD-leading three year (1979-81)
conservation effort of a 16 percent reduction in oil imports,
a fact acknowledged by major supplier OPEC nations at the
quarterly conferences in 1981. But despite Japan's dogged
determination, the inescapable reality of imported oil
dependence will remain throughout the century. Conservation
and substitution/diversification of oil supplies is not the
final solution to a nation with proven crude reserves of less
than 60,000,000 barrels [Ref.18]: there is indeed a self-
generated limit! To realize this limit, Japan's concern
about energy in the next two decades has focused on two
tasks:
1. To secure enough oil to maintain steady growth
2. To diversify her sources of energy
H. JAPANESE ENERGY POLICY
In an effort to solve her energy problems yet allow a
continued growth rate in the 1980s (official long-term
target: +5.7 percent), the Energy Council of MITI published a
Long-Term Energy Plan in 1979. The crux of this Plan is
generated along an energy conservation strategy of:
a. diversifying the geographical sources of oil imports
b. expanding alternative sources of energy: nuclear
power coal , and natural gas
50

c. conscientiously filling the petroleum/LNG stockpiles
to assigned allocations (discussed in Appendix B)




The underlying motif of Japan's oil import policy
since 1974 has been geographical diversification. Table IX
reflects the Persian Gulf reliance still prevalent in 1981,
but points out the major supplier shift from Iran to Saudi
Arabia as a result of oil shock # 2. In addition, the
gradual build-up of Asian sourcing begins to appear in the
"Top Three Suppliers" column of Table X. Specific
procurement and recent-foreign MNC dealings are described in
Appendix A and are shown in Tables IV and V; as mentioned
earlier, the trend in recent years has been toward an
increase in government-to-government (GG) deals and spot
market or direct deal (DD) purchases to augment shortfalls on
seasonal periods of peak demand. GG deals allow Japan to
play its "diplomatic card" when necessary, utilizing the DFI
,
ODA, and "technology for oil" angles for bargaining leverage
with oil supplier nations. A prime example of this patented
"petro-diplomacy" is presented in Appendix C - "Japan
Discovers Mexico".
2. Alternative Energy
Though even the most pessimistic forecasts credit
Japan with notable progress in its energy program, the grim




Kinds and Sources of Energy Supply in Japan
/
Kinds of Energy Import Volume Share in Overseas
World Trade (%)»• Dependency (%>
'
FY" 1979CY I980FY
Top Three Suppliers (%) 1980CY
No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 Tot a
Oil l.OOOkl




Saudi Arabia Indonesia U.A.E.





75 (500) Australia China U.S.A.
80 7.234 — 38.8 67.6 11.7 5.5 84.8
Coking 1965 (15.870)
Coal 70 (42.059)
75 (60.813) Australia U.S.A. Canada





75 (62.339) Australia U.S.A. Canada
80 73,072 26.3 80.2 43.0 28.7 16.0 87."
Liquefied LNG l.OOOt
Gas 1965 1969=182
70 977 (Natural G;is) (Natural Gas) Indonesia Brunei U.A.E.
75 5.005
80 16,964 10.4 88.7 50.5 33.0 11.5 95.0






Saudi Arabia Kuwait Australia
80 10.063 — 63.5 54.1 18.4 12.1 84.6
Uranium Committed l.OOOstU.O. Canada England South Africa Australia:
Ore as of No. 4 (10.-%)
Oct .1981 1% 31.6 22.4 14.8 68.8
a) Japanese fiscal year: April 1 through March 31 of following year
b) Data for World Trade Share were in physical terms.
c) Rate of foreign dependence is calculated as follows:
Import Volume - Export Volume
Domestic Production Volume + Import - Export Volume
x 100
Source: MITI. White Paper on International Trade. 1981




for approximately 40-45 percent of its energy by the end of
the century. The only way to force this dependence figure
downward and continue to keep it low is to pursue a
determined strategy of alternative energy diversification.
The MITI Energy Strategy includes expansion and promotion
into three alternate sources: coal, nuclear power, and gas
(Liquid Natural Gas-LNG/Liquid Petroleum Gas-LPG) (Table XI).
3. Prospects for Coal
In 1960 the Japanese began to convert from coal to
oil for the industrial energy demand. 1980 realized a
complete circle as MITI encouraged the industrial and
electric power sectors to revert to coal (indeed, oil-fired
power stations are not to be constructed after 1985). Japan
has proven onshore coal reserves of 8 billion tons but much
of this total is low grade, existing in thin seams and in
deep mines; technically, most experts agree that 1 billion
tons are economically recoverable [Ref.19, p. 24]. The main
attraction of coal is the plentiful supply in the Pacific
Basin (especially PRC, USSR, Australia, Canada, and USA-all
nations with whom external trade balance problems exist for
the Japanese). At present, 20 coal fired power plants are in
operation producing over 5 million KW on approximately 9
million tons of coal; 8-10 more plants are in the planning/
construction stage with a projected 11 million KW power
production. This should achieve the MITI projections of an 18
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environmental concerns existing with coal based power (bulk
ash, desulfurization , and transportation/storage visibility
problems), this will probably be the maximum limit of energy
obtained from coal until the R&D efforts of gasification/
liquefaction begin to be realized in the 1990s.
4. Prospects for Nuclear Power
Nuclear power offers Japan the greatest prospect
along with the greatest number of problems. The well known
and perhaps understandable popular vocal opposition to "all
things nuclear" has caused MITI to revise its nuclear power
generation goals numerous times in the last 5 years. But the
30 million KW 1990 target now seems both attainable and
realistic for planning purposes (Table XII). This would
increase nuclear generation to a 12 percent share of energy,
well on its way to the 25 percent goal by the end of the
century. Japan's twenty-second power reactor went into
operation in 1981 - most are either General Electric or
Westinghouse technology. Momentum behind the nuclear power
strategy is fueled by the need to reduce hydrocarbon energy
sourcing (crude/gas) but Japan has faced the same
difficulties that all nations have experienced - a concerned
populous fueled by Japan's August, 1945, experience, then
strengthened, by Three Mile Island, and finally a 1981
onshore case of sloppy waste-disposal at a reactor in
Northern Honshu. But Japanese R&D has advanced steadily in
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the CANDU developed reactor (assisted by Canada) and the
advanced thermal reactor (ATR) which reached critical state
in 1979. Where Japan has made its greatest strides in
nuclear technology has perhaps been in the field of uranium
reprocessing and enrichment. In keeping with their desire to
be in the forefront of technology, the Japanese completed
trial reprocessing of spent fuel at the Tokai facility in
1978. With the November, 1981, arrangement between Japan's
AEC and the US DOE nuclear development branch, the Tokai
plant will be able to reprocess US-origin spent nuclear fuel
through 1984 [Ref.20]. The decision to construct a second
reprocessing plant will be announced in 1982; at present
contracts with UK, France, and the USA combined with the
Japanese facility to treat the less than 500 tons of fuel per
year. But a much larger plant will be needed by 1990 to meet
her expanding nuclear generation sector.
5. Prospects for Natural Gas
The key element in Japan's oil substitution policy
rests with natural gas. LNG has proven especially useful for
electricity generation and the manufacture of town gas. The
1980 import-figure of 16 million tons (almost all from
Indonesia, Brunei, AbuDhabi, and Alaska) is projected to
triple by 1985 in order to boost the current 7 percent LNG
energy share to over 12 percent. Storage capacity
facilities, receiving terminals, and LNG tanker-construction
projects have received tremendous sums of government and
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industry-borne assistance in the last three years. A
sizeable capital investment is required to provide
liquefaction facilities to take the product from the storage/
holding stage to the thermal plant for energy production.
The major population centers in the Kanto/Kansai areas have
realized environmental advantages of the clean fuel, high
thermal efficiency of an LNG power plant as the Tokyo and
Osaka Electric Power Companies were first to complete major
LNG electric plants. The gas option will grow in importance
throughout the decade as Japan continues its oil-fired
facility conversion to the cheap but environmentally
distasteful steam coal plant; LNG offers a "clean," efficient
advantage and is found increasingly in the geographically
convenient Pacific Basin.
6. Prospects for Other Energy Sources
In the provisional long-term energy demand/supply
predictions, MITI has forecast that about 10 percent of total
needs will come from a combination of nuclear fusion, solar
thermal power generation, gasified coal sources, and deep
geothermal harnessing. The Sunshine and Moonlight R&D
projects which began in the aftermath of Oil Shock # 1 and
are expected to assit these various energy options toward
maturity in the 1990s (Table XIII).
The main burden of oil replacement through the 1990s
will fall on the conventional systems discussed: coal,
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effort is making progress in brown coal gasification at an
experimental plant in Australia. The initial economic
forecast is for profitable expansion in this energy field
when crude oil reaches a $50/barrel level. The volcanic
islands of Japan are thought sufficient to contain enough
geothermal reserve for four times the present annual energy
demand. Six plants operating in 1980 produced over 200 MW by
tapping the deep thermal energy existing in the central
Honshu mountains. The Sunshine Project is involved in solar
housing construction utilizing panels and reflective mirrors.
A windfall from this seven year ongoing project has been the
massive surge in commercial solar panel sales (over $100 M is
1979). Behind this search for alternative energy and hopes
to reduce oil dependence is Japan's greatest power base - its
technical capacity and adaptability [Ref.21], The progress
of these non-hydrocarbon base energy sources is extremely
important to Japan's energy strategy in the 21st century.
Over 50 percent of the Science and Technology Agency's budget
continues to be devoted to R&D in these "energy conter-
measures programs."
In spite of her "first place team finishes" during
the last few years as the energy conservation leader of the
International Energy Association (IEA)*, Japan remains
*IEA: Organization of major western oil importers formed




inescapably dependent on importing oil as well as the other
strategic resources listed on Table I. There is a limit on
how much one can do to lessen dependence, how far one can go,
and what to risk in order to increase economic leverage with
resource suppliers. To investigate Japan's strategic
resource economic offensive in the Third World, regional case
studies will be presented from Southeast Asia, the Persian
Gulf, and Southern Africa.
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IV. REGIONAL MARKET OVERVIEW: SUPPLIERS
The three geographic regions chosen for case examination
in this study are vital to Japan's economy due to the
reserves/resources* that are abundant in each area. It is
worth keeping in mind that of the critical resources
discussed in this study, 60-95 percent of the material comes
from the first five largest producing nations; in other
words, the largest producers are indeed countries in which
the resources were originally discovered. A list of these
regions, the countries included for this study, and the most
important minerals exported by region will provide ample
evidence as to their importance in Japan's marketplace (Chart
1).
When referring to Chart I, it is important to remember
that though a resource-poor nation, Japan is a leading
mineral precessing and metal producer in the world. As
mentioned earlier, 50 percent of Japanese imports consist of
raw materials, but an ever more important 25 percent of her
exports are processed mineral metal products. The total
value of Japan's mineral output, including the value added
reserves: estimates of the amount of a mineral that can
be economically and legally extracted from an identified body
of known resources; resources: usually larger estimates of
the total amount of a mineral whose extraction is only
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Brunei, though not yet a member of ASEAN, included for purpose
of this study only.
Source: US Bureau of Mines, 1979
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from processing imported materials, has averaged 10 percent
of the GNP over the last five years. Japan produced between
5 and 15 percent of the global output in the following
products (1976-1980): refined lead, magnesium, petroleum
products, steel ingots/products, aluminum, titanium,
tungsten, and refined zinc. (US Bureau of Mines)
A. SOUTHEAST ASIA
Japan's experience in Southeast Asia since 1970 has
followed a dual track: multi-lateral ties with ASEAN as a
political entity and increasing bilateral economic relations
with its individual member states.
1. ASEAN: Multilateral Perspective
Japan is closely related with Southeast Asia
geographically and historically. But economic cooperation
has been a 20th century phenomena which has deepened so much
in the 1970s that the term "interdependence" has become
almost a reality for the remainder of this century. In 1980,
10 percent of Japan's overall trade, 20 percent of its
foreign investment, and 30 percent of its economic
cooperation was directed toward the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nat ions-( ASEAN) [Ref.24];
Japan's dominance as a trading/investment /cooperation partner
is unrivaled in the ASEAN states today. Even closer
"economic complementation" between these two partners has
been the subject of several annual conferences since 1974,
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seven years after ASEAN was formalized by Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indoesia, and the Philippines.
Earlier efforts to define the basis for Japan-ASEAN
ties were some what unsuccessful due to several reasons:
1. ASEAN was too young as an institution and the
framework to promote economic cooperation was ill-defined
prior to the mid 1970s.
2. Japanese efforts to promote expanded cooperation
in Southeast Asia tended to emphasize bilateral aspects
rather than organizational ties with ASEAN.
3. The memories of the pre-WWII "Co-Prosperity
Sphere" were hard to erase; this caused the Japanese to
perhaps become overly cautious in economic dealings and
resulted in an apprehensive mood on the ASEAN actors part.
But conditions improved in the early 1970s, the
winding down of the Vietnamese Conflict being most beneficial
to the geopolitical-economic operations of all Asian states,
and the eager traders matured quite rapidly. The framework
for a successful economic partnership became self-evident:
On the ASEAN side-
1. Abundant raw materials needed by Japanese
industry; prospects were good for lowering final product
cost by increased development and processing.
2. Relatively cheap transportation costs as the
closest Third World market for the Japanese.
3. Abundant manpower at low cost.
4. Lower site development costs.
5. A preferred "home market base", i.e., the Pacific
Basin.
6. Abundant energy reserves in both hydrocarbon
(crude/gas) and alternate (hydro, geo-thermal )
.
On the Japanese side-
1. Greater availability of capital
2. Advanced technology
3. Large industrial capacity, both onshore and
exportable
4. Large domestic market
5. Established international marketing power
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6. The willingness to embark on a successful,
mutually beneficial path.
ASEAN diplomatic efforts by Japan intensifed in the
1978-81 timeframe with the visits of three Prime Ministers
(Fukuda, Ohira, Suzuki) and the announced policy of the
promotion of small/medium enterprises, development of human
resources, expansion of export manufactures, and the solving
of the energy crisis. When Prime Minister Suzuki visited all
five nations in January 1981, he proclained that Japan was
ready to "actively assist ASEAN in their efforts for
socioeconomic development."
a. Japan-ASEAN Commodity Trade ( JETRO White Paper )
During the 1970s ASEAN has grown to be a major
exporter of primary commodities; three member states have an
export dependence on minerals, metals, and fuels ranging from
95 percent (Indonesia/Brunei) to 55 percent (Singapore). In
the all-important energy field the Philippines and Thailand
have a substantial import dependence (70%) and the other
three remain net energy exporters (Singapore has the Asia's
largest refining capacity). The largest import component
across-the-board has characteristically been manufactured
goods. An outward looking bloc, the bulk of ASEAN trade
(85%) is carried on outside of Southeast Asia and the close
geographic proximity and possession of raw materials helps
explain the burgeoning Japanese-ASEAN trade. An important
producer of rubber, timber, palm oil, copra, sugar, tin,
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crude oil, and natural gas, the member nations have evolved
an effective community trading strategy based on the
principle of collective bargaining with the Japanese. The
ASEAN policy objectives have blended together effectively
with the Japanese goals of: attainment of stable commodity
prices, the solidifying of steady long-term growth of
exports, and securing of improved access to markets. 1980
Japanese imports from ASEAN totalled 11.5 billion dollars (up
approximately 50% from '79) thus garnering a 15% share of
Japan's global import market. Mineral fuels and raw
materials led the way (up 2/3 with sugar and fishing products
registering stable growth (Table XIII). Exports to ASEAN
totalled 3.7 billion dollars (up 10%), a 9.5% share of
Japan's global market; biggest gains were registered in
plant /machinery exports, agricultural equipment, and
electronic gear [Ref.25].
b. ODA/DFI: #1 on the Tokyo Program
As Tables VI, VII indicate, Japan's foreign
ministry continues to view Asia as the top priority in
official development assistance with a three year average of
a 65 percent share of total global ODA disbursements. ASEAN
has consistently garnered one half of all ODA destined for
Asia and Japan has increasingly stressed education and
training assistance to these developing nations in addition
to the more common tangible aid projects. Both humanitarian
concerns and the recogniion of mutual interdependence between
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the industrially developed model and these developing nations
underpin Japan's economic assistance. In addition, strategic
considerations as a major partner in OECD have recently come
to the forefront: 85 percent of Japan's crude oil is shipped
via the Malacca Straits; to the extent that any instability
would disrupt this supply, economic growth and political
well-being is ASEAN is essential for Japan. Hence, ODA
represents an appropriate and effective Japanese alternative
to regional defense expenditures, and option which ASEAN does
not desire and one which the Japanese are prohibited from
offering by their own Constitutional guidelines.
The 20 percent share of Japanese global DFI extended
to ASEAN gas been fairly steady in the last ten years.
However, the pattern of investment within these nations has
been changing. The rapidly growing industrial progress in
the NIC's (Singapore/Thialand) has brought with it rising
wages and labor costs; the result is a gradual shift in
manufacturing industries to the Philippines and Malaysia.
Yet another factor that the Japanese have considered more
carefully in the last three years is the risk and
responsibility in overseas investment. Table XIV is
representative of private industry's concern for
political/economic stability in overseas ventures (All 5
ASEAN states came out in the top half in both years). More
than ever before, the Japanese government is being pressured




FIRMS RATE HAZARDOUS COUNTRIES FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES
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The Nihon Keizai Shibun recently published a survey of 100
leading Japanese companies in which each respondent was
asked to evaluate 76 given nations in terms of risks in-
volved when engaging in overseas investments and major
trade contracts. As in a similar survey conducted in 1980,
the United States came out on top as the least risky nation
with which to do business, with a rating of 8.99 out of a
possible 10. Nations posing the greatest risks were
Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon and Ethiopia.
Three main factors were taken into consideration in making
these evaluations: stability of government, capability to
service external debts, and stability of currencies. Of
the 100 companies surveyed, 26 had suffered a total of 39
cases of damage in the year ended last July 30. Iran top-
ped the list of the notorious with a total of 14 cases.
The most common damage involved non-payment for export
deals, unilateral discontinuation of plant construction
projects, and cancellation of export contracts. Those
companies most severely affected were trading houses, banks
and industrial plant makers.
































TABLE XIV (cont . )
FIRMS RATE HAZARDOUS COUNTRIES FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES
Rank
1981 1980 Country Points
18 21 Saudi Arabia 6.14
19 22 Taiwan 6.07
21 25 Kuwait 5.99
23 18 Mexico 5.95
26 15 United Arab Emirates 5.62
27 31 Indonesia 5.61
29 32 South Korea 5.54
30 27 Soviet Union 5.44
32 35 Thailand 5.25
34 40 South Africa 5.21
35 32 China 5.05
36 24 Philippines 5.01
56 45 Iraq 3.68
61 65 Mozambique 3.08
75 73 Iran 2.19
76 75 Afghanistan 1.78
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benefits, and other cooperative requests by businesses being
encouraged by MITI to expand DFI . The government is being
asked to "prepare the overseas investment environment" to
reduce business risks.
c. Plant Exports
The linkage between commodity trade emphasizing
raw materials, official development assistance concentrating
on training and education, and direct foreign investment in
these developing nations is best personified by the demand
for plant exports from Japan to Southeast Asia (Table XV).
These three economic inputs have polarized in the ASEAN
region resulting in a significant increase in export-licenses
issued since the inset of the "economic complementation"
phase between Japan-ASEAN (1974-present ) . In FY80, plant
exports to Asia were up 30 percent totalling over 25 new
industrial composite sites including [Ref. 26]:
1. Singapore- petrochemical complex $720M/turbine
generator factory $160M
2. Indonesia- cement plant $160M/power generation
facility $200M/LNG plant $675M/ aluminum smelter $1.2B
3. Philippines- copper smelter S380M
4. Thailand- steel mill $50M (share)
5. Malaysia- Fertilizer plant $300M (projected)
In addition to these projects, negotiations
continue with ASEAN states for a plethora of similar plant
exports which specialize in petrochemical or raw materials
processing, two plant categories that have amounted to over
40 percent of global export licenses by type over the past




10 Largest Importing Countries of Japan Made Plants
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FIGURE 1
Industrial Plant Exports by Region
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stagnating world economy, Japan's medium and long term plant
exports are expected to develop further along with the
promotion of increased ODA/DFI /commodity trade. Plant
exports are in the limelight as a means of providing and
promoting economic cooperation and technology transfer
effectively.
2. Bilateral Perspective
Indonesia is of immense strategic and economic
significance to Japan, arguably only second in importance to
that of the USA. 60 percent of Japanese trade and 90 percent
of her energy imports pass through Indonesian waters. In
1980 Indonesia became Japan's third largest trading partner
(behind USA and Saudi Arabia) and surpassed all but North
America in cumulative Japanese DFI (over 3 billion dollars).
Likewise, Japan is perhaps of even greater importance to
Jakarta: accounting for over 40 percent of Indonesia's trade
while providing a full 40 percent of foreign investment and
30 percent of foreign aid totals received by Indonesia during
1979 [Ref.28], The nearly 11 billion dollars of total
trade in 1980 left Japan with a 6.5 billion dollar deficit
due to energy imports; Indonesia was the source of 15 percent
of Japan's oil, 50 percent of its LNG, and 20 percent of
other imported raw materials. Japan's diversification of
energy supplies, by type and source, has increased its
business with Indonesia due to its large proven reserves in
both crude and gas. Already entrenched as Japan's #2 crude
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oil source (after Saudi Arabia) the natural gas contracts
negotiated in March 1981, called for a minimum of 13.5
million tons of LNG yearly to Tokyo/Osaka electric power
companies commencing in 1983; this will give Indonesia a
projected 60 percent share of Japan's LNG business [Ref.29].
In striking economic contrast, the 2 billion dollars of
exports from Japan (2 percent of their world total)
represented 30 percent of Indonesia's total imports. There
is little doubt that this ASEAN member will remain
inextricably bound with Japan in a relationship of
ever-increasing interdependence which has proved profitable
to both.
Malaysia is being cast by Chase Econometrics as the
"growth miracle" in Asia during the 1980s: "... together with
Australia, the only economy in the area which will improve
performance steadily over the decade." If this projection is
realized, Japan will surely benefit from the resulting
windfall profits. With the rising cost of energy forcing
increased plant exports and the existence of cheap and
abundant labor, Malaysia is a valuable target of opportunity
for Japan. The 1980 trade total of 5.5 billion dollars left
Japan with another energy- induced deficit of 1.5 billion
dollars. A graphic case study of Japanese participation in
Malaysia was done by Paul Cheeseright in August, 1980,
[Ref.30], concerning the most northeast state in the
Federation: Sabah . Japan buys 61 percent of Sabah's
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exports— including most of her crude oil, all of her copper,
and the lion's share of the fishing and timber products. In
contrast, Japan provides 22 percent of Sabah's imports
(mostly machinery /manufactured products). Japanese DFI
includes owning/operating the only copper mine, construction
of highways and port facilities, hydro-electric power
development, a monopoly of the lumber industry process, and
fishing industry assistance. Sabah is an excellent example
of the developing state in Southeast Asia: rich in
resources, ripe for investment, isolated from the mainstream,
and seeking partners for business ventures. The Japanese
have capitalized on this LDC model throughout the world.
In 1980, with rubber and tin prices on a decling
trend with the world economy, the Japanese chanced an
increase in their commodity purchases slightly and Malaysia,
Thailand and Indonesia remained the source of over 85 percent
of these two resources. On the investment /plant export
negotiating agenda for 1982 are projects in LNG processing,
two refineries, a steel factory, one thermal and one
hydroelectric power plant, and the finalization of bidding on
a fertilizer plant which has attracted five foreign
consortiums to be (financially sponsored by the Japanese
Export-Import Bank). Interdependence and economic
complementation are growing realities in Malaysian-Japanese
relations of the 1980s.
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Though Brunei is a semi-autonomous suzerain of Great
Britain, its immediate future following independence (1983)
will almost surely include ASEAN membership. The Japnese
realized investment and ODA potential here early-on and began
reaping the benefits in the late 1970s as virtually all of
Shell Brunei's natural gas production is destined for Japan.
The 1981 oil and gas returns were estimated at 8 billion
dollars for this state of 200,000 people, giving Brunei the
highest per capita income of any Asian state [Ref.31]. LNG,
increasing in importance to the Japanese, will continue to
attract Japanese interest throughout this decade and along
with it the accompanying DFI/ODA projects will be directed
toward this tiny but important state in Japan's Southeast
Asian partnership scheme.
Though two-way trade totalling 2.6 billion dollars in
1980 resulted in an 800,000 dollar deficit for Thailand
,
Japan stands out as the number one trading partner for the
Thais. It has also been the single largest foreign investor
with a cumulative DFI of 401 million dollars as of June 1981.
Bangkok has a long history of trade deficits with Tokyo and
the most recent economic negotiations have tended to
emphasize 0DA/DFI in the large-scale industrial area in order
to make local manufactures more export-oriented. As a
result, plant exports (auto, petrochemicals, hydro-electric)
and agro-based industries have garnered the lion's share of
investment and technology transfer funds. The steadily
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growing 7 percent share of Japanese ODA in 1981 ($240M) was
directed toward increasing food production, assisting the
Cambodian refugee support programs on the Thai border, and
included a guarantee of some 65 million dollars to assist in
the construction of a propane plant south of Bangkok [Ref.
32] . A limited source of tin and rubber to the Japanese, the
1981 natural gas discoveries in the Gulf of Siam will have to
prove out at greater export potential than the present Union
Oil predictions for the Thais to have any hope of denting
their chronic trade deficit with the Japanese; Thailand, like
the Philippines, suffers from an inescapable deficit
post ion due to a lack of developed energy reserves.
A ground-breaking ceremony was held in Singapore
harbor in July, 1980, on the Pulau Merbau 1.4 billion dollar
petrochemical complex — a 50:50 joint venture between
Sumitomo (et.al.) of Japan and the Singapore government [Ref.
33]. The Japanese shareholders include 28 corporations,
banks, trading companies, and the government Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund. With total trade exceeding 6
billion dollars in 1980, Singapore continued to be a major
supplier of refined oil and pertroleum products in addition
to receiving a large percentage of Japan's raw materials and
machinery for plant operations. Perhaps the most rapidly
developing state in the ASEAN group, Singapore has spent
millions of dollars on conservation R&D and is utilizing
Japanese assistance in industrial energy conservation
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planning and for consulting advice as they continue to shift
gears into the high technology business. The close economic
relationship between these two 1970s success-stories will
continue to grow as Japan depends more and more on overseas
joint ventures in raw materials processing as a partial cure
for her sensitive trade balance problem with ASEAN. Japan
became this island-nation's number one bilateral trade
partner (surpassing Malaysia) in 1981; DFI was estimated at
700 million dollars with over 1,000 Japanese businesses
represented in Singapore. It is a fact that Japanese capital
continues to make a vital contribution to building Singapore
into a financial business center for Asia.
Economic relations between the Philippines and Japan
have been strained at times and clearly on the softest ground
of the ASEAN members. Most of the Japanese investment
(estimated $500 million) is from Tokyo's MNC ' s which
sometimes clash interests with local Filipino concerns. The
structure of Japanese-Philippine trade personifies the worst
of the classic "North-South" scenarios: steel products,
machinery, chemicals, electronics exported in exchange for
lumber, coconut oil, bananas, sugar, and copper. Yet trade
has grown steadily over the past eight years with Manila
incurring only a 39 million dollar deficit in 1979 due mainly
to increase copper, chrome and non-ferrous scrap exports.
The Philippine economy has been in flux due mostly to the
erratic oil exploration success offshore in the South China
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Sea. The Central Bank has reached its borrowing credit limit
with foreign banks and now is turning in this decade to Japan
for economic cooperation with loan/ODA/DFI efforts. The
visits of MITI head Tanaka and Prime Minister Suzuki (twice)
in 1981 have resulted in guarantees for human resources
projects ($100 million), power plant and geothermal
development assistance ($208 million) and increased ODA to
$160 million (8% above '79/80) [Ref.34]. Other plant
projects under negotiation include an LNG processing
facility, and cement, fertilizer and pulp/paper factories.
But the inequities of bilateral trade seem to be inescapably
present between these two Pacific Basin states. To many
Filipinos, nothing really seems to have changed as far as
wartime economic Japanese goals are concerned — the
occupation forces simply carry business cards now.
B. THE PERSIAN GULF
1. Multilateral Perspective
The history of exchanges between Japan and the Middle
East can be traced back more than 5,000 years but the
progress of such exchanges, initially over land on the Silk
Road, has only recently realized dramatic expansion via the
sealanes, through the Straits of Malacca. Diplomatic
relations suspended during World War II were resumed in the
1950s and Japan opened her first local trading company in
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owned Arabian Oil Company (Appendix A) facilitated the
advancement of other enterprises as Japan's highly paced
economic growth continued in the 1960s. Gradually banks and
manufacturing firms began to establish small ventures
expanding into other Gulf states: Iran 1960, Iraq 1961,
Kuwait 1965. Japan's exports to this area began to show a
modest increase but her DFI /ODA figures still registered
amounts hardly worthy of a MITI /Foreign Ministry "Middle East
Desk Officer's" time. But even after 15 years of a growing
reliance on Gulf oil for her rapidly expanding economy, Japan
had directed less than 5 percent of her DFI and less than one
percent of ODA toward this area. Japan was relying on
Western petroleum majors to supply her energy needs and the
cash-on-the-barrel attitude reflected an almost total lack of
official interest in formulating a coherent diplomatic policy
toward the Arab world.
The 1973 Oil Crisis, quaintly termed "Oil Shock" in
Tokyo, devastated the Japanese. The lights literally went
out while Prime Minister Tanaka and his Cabinet hastily
formulated diplomatic actions that would remove Japan fom the
Arab "Neutral" List (5% oil export reduction) created on 20
October. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani's 12 November 1973,
ultimatum to Japan was to-the-point
:
If you are hostile (ie, continue to recognize Israel)
to us, you get no oil. If you are neutral, you get oil but
not as much as before. If you are friendly (ie, support
Arab diplomatic/economic sanctions against Israel), you
get the same oil as before [Ref.35].
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Tokyo succumbed immediately and on 22 November issued a
declaration urging Israel to withdraw from the 1967 occupied
territories and threatened a "reconsideration of policy
toward Israel." This strategy resulted in late December
placement on the "friendly" list and the occasioned the first
of many Japanese Foreign Minister "goodwill visits" to the
Arab states.
a. Commodity Trade
The marked increase in petro dollars as a result
of the price-per-barrel jump in 1974 resulted in expanded
purchasing power for the OPEC members/oil producers in
general. Much of this new revenue flowed into machines and
equipment designed to develop infrastructures in the Gulf
region. The Japanese expanded plant exports immediately as
full-scale turn-key contracts and joint venture efforts began
to rekindle the flattening Japanese economy. But despite the
significant increases registered in exports to the Gulf
region since the 1973 Shock, the seventy percent reliance on
Persian Gulf crude oil has resulted in a consitently large
imbalance favoring the Arab states (Table XVI). These trade
figures tend to mask the efforts of a successful energy
consevation campaign waged by the Japanese — 1980 oil
imports were equal to 1972 totals (Table IX) — and the fact
that in FY81 the GNP rose by 3.8 percent while oil




Japan's Merchandise Trade with
the Middle East, 1968-80
(S million)
Exports Imports Balance
1968 535 1317 -1.282
1969 627 1.989 -1 .362
1970 634 2.337 -1.703
1971 824 3.013 -2.189
1972 1,174 3.491 -2.317
1973 1.774 4.941 -3.167
1974 3.680 15.920 -12.240
1975 6.075 16.477 -10,402
1976 7.276 18.745 -1 1 .469
1977 8.884 20.505 -11.621
1978 10.745 20.777 -10.032
1979 10.734 29.377 -18.643
1980 14.358 44 500 -30,142




Direct Japanese Overseas Investment
({million)
in the Middle East
Fiscal 1979 Fiscal 1980 Cumulative totals,
fiscal 1951-80



























Total 18 130 2.6 15 158 34 237 2.2S9 6.2




are even more indicative of this OECD conservation leader's
success story: 1973-81 GNP rose 35 percent, energy
consumption rose only 15 percent for an overall crude oil
import decline of 8 percent [Ref.36]. Tactics used by the
Japanese to reduce the growing massive imbalance with the
Gulf region include:
1. Marketing "third-country trade" (ie, buying
European goods for resale to the Mideast)
2. Expanding barter agreements (ie, crude oil for
cars)
3. Attracting Arab institutional investors in the
Japanese market (ie, government yen bonds/DFI)
But problems persist for even the most eager Japanese
overseas investors: few Arab speakers due to this relatively
"recent" emphasis in this region, a lack of Japanese
consulting firms compared to the traditional European/US
competition, a fluctuating yen rate in 1980/81, and the more
recent rise in area risks (Iranian revolution, US hostages,
Afghanistan invasion, Iran-Iraq War),
b. DFI/ODA
Until 1971, Japan's direct investment in the Gulf
area was less than 500 million dollars. A number of factors
constrained DFI projects: domestic capital spending needs,
capital outflows limited by the government for
balance-of-payraent reasons, exportable management /technology
inadequate, low wage levels at home favoring domestic
production. But the increasing trade surplus combined with
the 1973 Shock to witness a rapid change of pace in Japan's
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potential economic position: the yen appreciation made
overseas production cheaper, domestic wages increased
radically, capital outflow restrictions were eased by MITI
.
From a 650 million dollar total in 1974, overseas investment
has now exceeded the 2.5 billion dollar level (Table XVII).
Table XVIII outlines the major projects undertaken by the
Japanese in the Middle East during the previous eight years.
Financial institutions sought to establish Arab branches in
order to capitalize on revenue flows from export profits and
to entice Arab petrodollars into investment recycling in the
Japanese market; over 40 percent of the new securities issued
in 1981 by Japanese underwriters were purchased by Arab
institutions such as SIBC (Saudi Investment Corp) and SAMA
(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) [Ref.37]. The resurgence in
Japanese capital flow and corresponding Arab investment
interest is evidence of the faith that the Gulf states have
in Japan's economy and her ability to pay her continuing
large mineral fuels bill.
The notion that certain multilateral /bilateral
ties were sometimes "special" to the Japanese underpins
several important aspects of the ODA program. For Asia, this
"special" category was of diplomatic necessity because of
World War II occupation and the Co-Prosperity Sphere. For the
Persian Gulf region, the "special" ODA label was attached
shortly after the 1973 Shock. The rapid response of MITI and




JAPAN-MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL /ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1973-1981
1973
1 3 April Kuwait's Electricity &. Water Minister Abdullah Yousef al-Ghunem signs
contract with Khikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (III!) fur supply,
erection and completion of two water desalination plants, valued at KD 3.9



























Japanese I orcipn Trade Ministry and Japanese oil refineries oppose 11.9 per
cent increase in OPLC posicd prices
Abu Dhabi Oil Company (Japan) announces plans to build Abu Dhabi
industrial complex, to include oil refinery, aluminium smelter and soda
manufacturing plant
(iroup of Arab and Japanese banks announce establishment of a joint
banking venture UBAN-Arab Japanese Finance, to be based in Hongkong
Arab oil states announce Japan's excmpiion from December's 5 per cent
cut in oil supplies under the od embargo policy
Delegation led by Deputy Premier Takeo Miki tours Middle East to strengthen
relations with the Arab world, particularly oil producers
Japan agrees to extend loans totalling S 1,000 million to Iraq in return for
supply of crude oil and gas over 1 0-year period
Nissho Iwai Corporation and 1HI win $ 120 million oil refinery contract at
Banias, Syria
Group of eight Japanese firms wins $ 150 million contract to supply 220,000
tonnes of steel pipes to Saudi Arabia
Kobe Steel wins contract to build and manage $ 150 million iron and steel
complex at Umm Said industrial estate, Qatar
Penta-Ocean Construction Company wins three-and-a-half-year, 50.600
million yen (S 220.96 million) Suez Canal dredging contract
Toa Harbor Works wins contract valued at 10,950 million yen i'J 48 million)
for dredging work at port of Umm Qasr, Iraq
Economic and technical agreement is signed during Tokyo visit by Saudi
Minister of State for Planning Hisham Nazer
Algeria's Posts &. Telecommunications Ministry signs three protocol agree-
ments with Japanese firms for construction of earth satellite ground station,
telecommunications complex and two antenna stations
1H I and Nichimen Company win 5 53.1 million turnkey contract for four
desalination plants m Abu Dhabi
King Hussain of Jordan visits Tokyo for talks on Japanese participation in
Jordanian development schemes
Sonatrach, Algeria's siaie hydrocarbons concern, signs 145.000 million yen
(3 b 33 million) contraci with Japan Gasoline and C lion & Company for
construction of two natural gas trcaiment planis
Visit of Japan's Crown Prince Akihiio and Princess Michiko to Jordan
Mitsubishi Corporation and Chiyoda Chemical Eneineering A Construction
Company win $70 million contract to build natural gas liquefaction plant
at Umm Said for Qatar Gas Company
Saudi Arabia signs iwo port contracts valued at a combined S4 50 million
with Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering Company and a Souih Korean firm
Japan Oil Development Company (Jocko) agrees to take up its option for
12 per cent equity in developing onshore Upper ZAum oil field, Abu Dhabi
Japan Gasoline and C lioli win ilieir third coniraci, valued ai I 42.000 million
yen (S620 million), io build natural gas treatment plant at llaai R Mel,
Algeria
Istanbul Conference organised by Japan Co-operaiion Cenlre for ihe Middle
East, attended by deltffMitii Irom I 30 major Japanese companies
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TABLE XVIII (cont .
)




Japanese consortium led by Sasakura Eneincering Company wins $ 265
million contract to build two-unit desalination plant at Bushclu, Iran
Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha wins S400 million contract from Sonatrach to





















Furukawa Electric Company wins $ 230 million contract to supply state-
owned Power Generation & Transmission Company of Iran with an electric
power transmission line
Japanese consortium wins contracts totalling S 392 million for first phase of
10 desalination plants at Yanbu and Medina, Saudi Arabia
Nippon Kokan Arabia, a 50-50 joint venture between Nippon Kokan (NKK)
and other Japanese interests and Saudi Arabia's Arabian Petroleum Services
Company (Petroserv), officially starts business
Japan's Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda begins visit to Iran, Qatar, L'AE and
Saudi Arabia
Marubeni Corporation and Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering Company
win $400 million contract to build phosphate fertiliser plant in Tebessa,
Algeria
International Trade & Industry Minister Masumi Esaki begins tour of Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
Mitsubishi Corporation and Shimizu Construction Company win S 368.8
million contract for construction of town centre in Baghdad, Iraq; Marubeni
Corporation and Fujtta Corporation win 3 325 million contract to build
123-kilometre highway from Baghdad to Hit
Croup consisting of Mitsubishi. Sasakura. C Itoh, Hitachi and IHI win most
valuable single desalination plant contract yet awarded by Saudi Arabia for
40 desalination units at Jubail industrial complex - valued at S 955 million
UAF. Petroleum & Mineral Resources Minister Manaa Bin-Said al-Otaibah
visits Japan for talks with Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and
International Trade & Industry Minister
A 5181 million contract for a. Libyan cement works is won by Kawasaki
Heavy Industries
Foreign Affairs Minister Saburo Okita visits Jordan for talks on Middle East
politics and bilateral relations
A S 200 million contract to build fertiliser factory at Ruwais industrial zone.
Abu Dhabi, is awarded to Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction and
Mitsubishi
Iraq orders 60,000 vehicles from Japan's Toyota Motor Company, valued at
more than $ 200 million
Contract for modernisation of Mina al-Ahmadi refinery, Kuwait, valued at
5500 million-700 million, is awarded to JGC Corporation
Japan signs petrochemical venture in Saudi Arabia •
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat visits
Tokyo




aid in the short-terra — an unbelievable 100-fold increase
between 1972 and 1978 (Table VII). But today the regional
concentration of Japan's grant ODA is not in the Gulf region;
it is concentrated in Egypt ($700M in 5 years) and northern
Africa. The Persian Gulf states are primarily investment,
technological cooperation, and government loan recipients.
The huge sums of Japanese aid directed toward resource poor
Islamic nations in the last 5 years (Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt,
Bangladesh) has been transacted in part to demostrate support
for the overall "Islamic cause" which is chaired by the House
of Saud.
c. "Modified" Seikei Burni
Perhaps there is no more prolific global example
of the ability of the Japanese to reach consensus and
radically modify a policy concept than in the Middle East
during the last nine years. The traditional reliance on
separation of economic and politics, seikei burni, as a basis
of doing business with the Islamic world was traditionally
tolerated until October 1973. Bowing to the Yamani ultimatum,
the Japanese began to mollify their support of US positions
on the Arab-Israeli question in order to continue an
uninterrupted flow of oil to fuel their dramatic growth. The
announced support of UN Resolution 242, recognizing the
rights of all states to coexist, and backing of the Camp
David agreement has since been delicately balanced by a
refusal to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate
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representative of the Palestinians and, as yet (Feb* 82), no
clear cut policy statement on Prince Fahd's eight-point peace
plan. The Japanese have a distinct advantage in this region
(and the African area, for that matter) in that they are
without the legacy of colonial rule — they are in good
position to be "unbiased." And they continue to balance
business/diplomatic dealings within these diverse Islamic
states: resuming crude purchases from Iran in March 1981,
after an 11 month suspension; recommencing the numerous
construction projects in Iraq after an 18 month war-related
suspension; continuing large grant projects in the oil-poor
states of Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and N. Yemen; and,
balancing the massive capital flows in th moderate states of
the Gulf region with contracts in the more radical republics
of Libya, Algeria, and Syria. In 1980-1981, the Arabists
inside the Foreign Ministry were pushing for PLO recognition,
support of Prince Fahd's plan, and a more visible presence in
Mideast policy circles. The result of this pressure was
evident in the corresponding diplomatic exchange (Foreign
Ministers' Akita and Sonoda visits to Mideast, PLO Chairman
Arafat's visit to Tokyo, and the planned spring, 1982 visit
of Prime Minister Suzuki to the Mideast) and the increased
but even-handed business reflected in the investment and
trade tables. Egyptian President Sadat was to have visited
Tokyo in November 1981, but Middle East history altered that
trip, just as it has modified seikei burni.
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2 . Bilateral Perspective
The first talks on closer Saudi Arabian-Japanese
relations were held in 1971 when King Faisal visited Tokyo.
An agreement reached at the time called for ministerial level
meetings to be held at least every other year. After a
sluggish start, this program has realized fulfillment due to
Japanese concerns for a tranquil diplomatic environment to
support their rapidly accumulating investment /import market.
Independent development contracts began in 1974 and gradually
have transformed into the Japanese preferred joint venture
projects (Table XVIII) culminating in the summer of 1981 with
the signing of the Al Jubayl petrochemical contract, a record
1.5 billion dollar 50:50 venture which has now inflated to in
excess of an estimated 2.5 billion dollars by site completion
in 1985. The 53 Japanese industrial firms/financial groups
involved are backed by the government's Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund investment and a so-called "retreat clause"
which allows disengagement from the project in case of war or
revolution. In return for Japanese cooperation in this
effort, Saudi Arabia will supply "bonus" crude to Japan
(begun in January, 1982) to augment the already growing 33
percent share the Kingdom provides to Japan. Saudi Arabia has
been a consistent "top 5 finisher" on Japan's leading plant
export list (Table XV) and is expected to remain so due to
current negotiations on desalination and thermal power plant
construction agreements [Ref.38: p. 23]. The economic "lateral
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arabesque" performed by Japan in this region is best
exemplified by studying the trade table (XIX) and the crude
oil table (IX); the effects of Oil Shock #2, the Iranian
Revolution and the American hostage events, are reflected in
Japan's effective "crossing of the Persian Gulf" to continue
Mideast business. The decline of Japanese business
interests/imports in Iran is evident as are the corresponding
increases in Saudi/UAE bilateral business. The most notable
recent trends in Japanese participation in the Kingdom are in
the LPG import field (in keeping with the growing energy
diversification program) and in the growing interest in
geological surveys for non-hydrocarbon minerals in this large
nation; bauxite, copper, gold, nickel, zinc, uranium, and
some exotics exist in Saudi Arabia and the Japanese
Geological Mission has been a contracted participant in
surveying since the 1970s [Ref.39]. In addition, to partially
balance the traditional resources participation projects,
Japanese support for investments in solar-energy, arid-land
farming, and fish resource development has reinforced the
"positive attitude of Japan" toward cooperation in the Gulf
world. Businessmen are learning to live with the
uncertainties of Saudi politics and religion, somewhat
attested to by the rise of Saudi Arabia to the lofty "top 20"
position on the risk chart (Table XIV); but so long as one
third of their crude oil comes from here, the Japanese have
no alternative but to adapt.
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The well publicized story began for Japan in 1973
when work on the 1.3 million dollar Bandar Khomenini
petro-chemical plant began. The joint project between Iran
and Japan's Mitsui Company ended up 85 percent complete
before Iraqi bomb damage in October, 1980. Now, after a
revolution, a war, the American Embassy takeover, and
inflation, Japan's largest foreign investment is worth in
excess of 3.5 billion dollars, and, for all practical
purposes, is dead. As of December, 1981, the final pleas by
the Mitsui consortium to Iran's National Petrochemical
Company amounted to an utlimatum for insurance, investment
protection, "front money" before recommencing construction,
and war clause guarantees for the workforce [Ref.40]. Overall
Japanese DFI in Iran fell to an estimated 1 billion dollars
in 1981 [Ref. 41]; 1981 crude oil shipments continued an
erratic pace from April - October (500,000 b/d) after
resuming following an eleven month price squabble
interruption. The decline of business profile in Iran can be
seen in the crude/trade table (XIX). Japan was edged out by
West Germany in 1981 as the leading trade partner to Iran.
But with conditions still unstable within the ruling
government, all development projects will remain frozen while
both parties continue private talks. The mantle for
continuing dialogue between the two nations falls on Foreign
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Even with a war in progress, Iraq repeated its 1979
first place performance as Japan's leading market for
construction contracts awarded: 31 contracts for 521
million dollars (1979: 30 for $1.1 billion). A sample of the
diversity in projects (Table XX) over the previous three
years reflects Japanese interest in this traditional Gulf
business companion. Even with seven Japanese ships trapped in
the bomb-damaged waterway, the Shatt al-Arab, bilateral trade
grew consistently and was up 25 percent through the first six
months of FY81. But the Iran-Iraq war has indeed taken its
toll in delays on projects due to work stoppage and labor
repatriation; by December 1981, debts of 200 million dollars
had been claimed by Japanese companies and Iraqis had
provided assurances for an equitable indemnity schedule and
protection for workers [Ref.42]. The growing Japanese DFI
boom there is expected to continue just as has the demand for
Iraqi crude over the past eight years.
The the Japanese consider the remaining Gulf states
(Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman) an important market for
their industrial and consumer goods as well as a vital source
of crude oil and, more increasingly, natural gas. Japan
regularly tops the list of exporters in the region,
frequently beating competitors on price, availability, and
after-sales service, all in an effort to wage a concerted
compaign to reduce the average 4 or 5:1 export-to-import
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since 1974/75. Japan is the main trading partner for the
United Arab Emirates and Oman and is a consistent "top three"
partner with the others. The Gulf states have risen to fill
and import void created by Oil Shock #2 and now collectively
are providing Japan with more than 25 percent of her imported
crude and a similar amount of natural gas [Ref.43]. Japanese
oil companies are participating in the Gulf states to a much
greater degree than with the region giants (Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Iraq) and have several offshore ventures in Qatar,
Oman, and the UAE. Investment is active with plant exports
and major construction projects following the patterns
established in Saudi Arabia and Iraq (Table XXI):
1. In Kuwait, 50 percent of the desalinated water
comes from Tokyo's IHI Company locally installed plants.
2. In the UAE, the Japan Oil Development Company is
participating with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in
producing over 35 percent of the yield in this sheikdom.
3. In Qatar, the JGC corporation rebuilt a natural
gas liquids plant after a 1977 explosion and increased its
capacity to 1 million tons a year.
4. In Bahrain, Japanese financial institutions have
followed the lead of other investors and now have 18
recognized banking outlets on the island.
5. In Oman, six Japanese petroleum firms earned
development contracts in the first six months of FY82
allowing Japan to remain Oman's busiest petroleum
exploration participant.
An example of progressive Japanese barter-trade has
surfaced in early 1982. The Japan Oil Development company
will soon complete the final plans on a massive oil-for-
fresh-water deal with Abu Dhabi. As the empty very
large/ultra large crude carriers complete unnloading at
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onload 100,000 tons of water per hull for transport back to
the Gulf. The technology advances in crude oil washing
facilities have made it feasible to carry water for about 1
dollar a ton — at least 25 percent under desalinization
plant outlays [Ref.44]. The Japanese are not the first to
realize that a barrel of water may in some areas be worth a
barrel of crude, but JODCO is on the fringes of a major
promotion and the projects' viability has strong potential in
the Gulf and other regions where land reclamation and
intensive irrigation is underway.
C. SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. Background
Japan has a rather voracious appetite for raw
materials and its search for new sources of supply as well as
for fresh markets has brought them increasingly into contact
with Africa - especially the mineral rich section of Sub-
Saharan Africa below the 5 degree South latitude. The
countries in this region produce a great portion of the free
market economies minerals and in addition possess a vast
amount of the world's proved reserves of strategic resources
(Table XXII).
Before 1960 and the national "independence movements"
in Africa, Japanese contact was minimal; as Japan began to
search for new sourcing for her exploding economy, trade














RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA





Chromium South Africa, Zimbabwe 40% / 75%
Platinum
metals
S. Africa 54 / 75
Diamonds S. Africa, Namibia, Botswana,
Angola
50 / 83
Vanadium S. Africa 42 / 64
Manganese S. Africa 28 / 53
Columbium Mozambique, Zimbabwe 27 / 38
Uranium S. Africa, Namibia 21 / 32
Cobalt Zambia 31 / 16
Copper Zambia, S. Africa 13 / 16





Found in exportable quantities
throughout Southern Africa
3-7% / 2-62
Source: Compiled from US Bureau of Mines Yearbook ('79), Africa




until 1974 did a Japanese Foreign Minister visit the
continent: Toshio Kimurs's five nation trip marked the
beginning of Japan's awareness that Africa would soon be an
entity requiring a coordinated policy for ODA/DFI/and trade.
The growth of trade between 1961 and 1980 resulted in a
twelvefold increase amounting to over 9 billion dollars in
1980, 61 percent of which took place with the nations of
Southern Africa (Table XXIII). The major thrust of Japanese
interest here has been to diversify sources and secure
mineral supplies, and as a major economic superpower with no
colonial involvement in Africa, Japan has perhaps been more
successful in the 1960/70s than the other OECD nations. But
lately, these mineral rich states have been studying the OPEC
lesson book and are becoming increasingly conservation-
conscious and concerned about the value of resource rents as
the materials sit undeveloped in the ground. The Japanese
have been confronted with increasingly common requests for
development aid, technical assistance, and grant/loan
extensions. And the Japanese have responded in kind.
2. ODA/DFI
Up to 1973 Japanese aid to Africa was hardly
significant in either quality or quantity (Table VI). At
that time Japan admitted both cultural and language barriers,
a natural result of the lack of colonial history ties and
existing geographical constraints. An official Foreign




JAPAN'S TRADE WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA 1980
(Yen '000 with Yen 220= US $1 approx.)















in a four year plan to triple Japan's total ODA destined for
Africa. This goal was realized but the grant aid and
technical assistance portions represented less than 20
percent of her total cooperation in Africa. With the advent
of the 1978 "Seven Year Plan" to increase ODA, bilateral and
multilateral economic participation is again on the upswing
doubling between 1978-80 and now accounts for over ten
percent of Japan's overseas assistance. A frequent
participator in bilateral projects throughout Southern
Africa, Japan formally joined the 50-nation African
Development Bank in May 1981, with an initial five year loan
credit line of 27 million dollars [Ref.45]. This pledge
placed Japan among the top three donor members in the ADB
(along with Canada/USA). The Japanese success record in
modernization and industrialization is regarded by many
African states as a model for development and as a result,
emphasis on human capital training - education, technology
aid, and research grants - has correspondingly increased from
Japan into the "know-how" hungry African LDC's. Thousands of
African trainees, Japanese volunters, and technical experts
skilled in African problems have been involved in a growing
vocational aid program.
The 1.5 billion dollar Direct Foreign Investment
figure (Table IV), indeed only 4 percent of Japan's overseas
DFI , is reflective of the reluctance the Japanese have in the
economic stability and political climate existing in Southern
104

Africa. A review of the investment risks chart (Table XIV)
reveals that only South Africa made the top half of those
rated in the survey. Japanese business efforts have
concentrated in the mining/energy sectors which now account
for more than 75 percent of her DFI in this region. Raw
materials ventures in Africa began in Swaziland in 1964 with
the iron ore mining and railway construction; both projects
established to furnish ore to the Japanese ships bound for
Tokyo and this same effort, to obtain long-term supplies,
still proliferates Japan's African modus operendai.
3. Bilateral Ties
If the seikei bunri policy seemed somewhat "modified"
in the Middle East region in order to conveniently marry-up
political/economic objectives, the unmodified Japanese
version operates in full force in public dealings with the
Republic of South Africa . The refusal of the Japanese
government to allow direct investment into the South African
raw materials infrastructure leads to a perplexing situation:
on the one hand, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesmen were
often credited in 1980/81 with quotes about South Africa's
"morally bankrupt" regime and the fact the "Black Africa is
far more important to Japanese interests" [Ref.46]; yet on
the other hand, a reference to the African trade (Table
XXIII) reveals that the Republic is indeed in a category by
itself: as the number one trading partner with Japan on the
entire continent (no small task when one realizes that none
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of this bilateral trade involved crude oil/LNG). The two and
one third billion dollar 1980 figure takes on additional
significance when compared with the more traditional OECD
bilateral partners that South Africa has cultivated for
decades (USA, UK, FRG) : only a few percentage points separate
Japan from a "top three" billet [Ref.47]. Though not
directly involved in onshore joint ventures, South African
demand generates an identifiable market for Japanese business
as an importer of high tensile steel, electronics equipment,
and approximately one third of the Japanese four wheeled
vehicles marketed in Africa over the last five years.
Japanese imports are simply a mirror-image of the South
African mineral resources production/export (Table XXIV) with
iron ore, coal, uranium, and platinum leading the
quantity/value column. These resource imports provide an
example of indirect foreign investment due to Japanese demand
for the coking coal, iron ore, and uranium in South Africa:
Due to the traditional long-term Japanese contracts for these
materials, the South Africans were able to plan ahead and
budget capital to open two new industrial ports in 1976,
Saldanha (near Capetown) and Richards Bay (northeast of
Durban). These complexes account for thousands of jobs and
support not only the local economy but also, in the case of
Richards Bay, a Mozambican port facility due to a railroad
link which routes some ore to the north for Japanese ships




SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC MINERALS (1979)*
Global Position:






































** Western world only
Source: The Financial Times (5/26/81), South Africa '81,
and US Bureau of Mines (1979).
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For Japan, the predicament of dealing with South
Africa is the same as other OECD members are confronted: a
complex situation involving an industrial giant, economically
advanced, technologically progressive, and geographically
positioned on, literally, a "gold mine" of strategic
resources that Japan needs. Yet constant sanction pressures
are felt from the emerging states in Africa, the Frontline
States of Southern Africa, the OAU (Organization of African
Unity), the United Nations General Assembly, and the "South"
in general. Capitalizing on the "interdependence theory"
(that so much of this region depends on the well being and
economic health of South Africa) the Japanese have perhaps
preferred to continue their healthy trade relationship with
the Republic while even-handedly increasing their ODA/DFI/
participation with the rest of this region of Africa.
Turning to the Black States of Southern Africa,
Japanese 1970s interests followed OECD pathways to a great
extent: the minerals markets of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique,
and Angola accounted for more than half of the remaining
trade and much of the DFI in this region. There are signs of
increased ties in the recent past: diplomatically with visits
by the leaders of Zambia and Zimbabwe to Tokyo in 1980/81,
and economically with marked increases in bilateral trade
and a major thrust by Japan in the multilateral aid grant to




1. Zimbabwe - increased activity in commodity
traffic, especially chrome, but a reluctance to increase
investment due to what the Japanese see as a "politically
delicate situation" due to skilled white emigration. The
recent visit of President Mugabe to Tokyo resulted in
pledges of ODA grants and loans in excess of 100 million
dollars for projects in this rapidly changing nation.
2. Zambia - the traditional leading supplier of
Japan's copper (over 50,000 tons annually throughout the
1970s), this country has also become an important cobalt
source due to increasing concern for the business risks in
Zaire. A 1980 deal tied-in the biggest rice-for- copper
barter program ever signed, but Zambia has maintained a
traditional 5 or 6:1 advantage in trade balance with the
Japanese for years. The visit of President Kaunda to Tokyo
in 1980 resulted in the finalizing of a construction
contract for a sulphuric acid plant ($40 M) and increased
grants/loans for railway and telecommunications
development
.
3. Mozambique - a purchaser of much of the mined
columbium here, the Japanese have tried to balance
business with fishing industry assistance and overseas
volunteer technological training programs. But the overall
investment environment in this struggling nation has
prevented large increases in DFI /grant assistance.
4. Angola - a major petroleum contract signed in 1978
has begun to attract Japanese investment interst in the
Luanda/Cabinda area. Trading companies were active in 1981
and the resulting business is expected to secure Angola's
hold on the number 3 position in bilateral trade with
Japan in this region.
5. Malawi - probably the largest increase in grant
ODA from Japan has been realized by one of the regions
poorest states. Answering a UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) plea for soft loan
aid, the Japanese have extended over 10 million dollars in
irrigation and airport modernization assistance in the
last two years; project supervision with technological
instruction has been conducted on site by Japanese
volunteers.
Japan has followed a carefully selected path in
Africa. After thirty years of investing globally as an
independent nation, her total DFI on the entire continent is
only 1.5 billion dollars; more than 50 percent of that amount
is tied up in the tiny merchant marine king, Liberia [Ref.
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50] . Development assistance continues to increase, but will
probably level off again at the 10-12 percentile (Table VI)
due to budgeting priorities and economic necessity. The
Japanese have pursued a pragmatic goal-oriented route in
every bilateral relationship in Southern Africa; the long-
term philosophy of bilateral trade, resource development
participation/technology, training in entrepreneurial skills
and, from time-to-time, ODA in grant and soft loan form has
worked well for Japan. And it is the long-term which is most
important - for the immediate future, this region can offer




For three decades Japanese foreign policy was moulded by
the dictum: "Smile, sleep, and stay silent." From the safe
haven of the US defense umbrella, Japan tended to hang on to
US foreign policy strings. But a number of developments in
the 1970s have forced a local reappraisal and the Japan of
the 1980s has begun to step out on her own as one of the
world's premier economic superpowers.
A series of "National interest shocks" occurred in Asia
during the turbulent 1970s which affected Japan's
international policy outlook: the 1973 oil shock, the
"opening" of China, the announced US troop withdrawal from
South Korea, the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese, the
Soviet military actions in Afghnistan and in the Northern
Islands, and the general decline in the entire region's
economy due continuing deficit problems attributed to oil
shock #2 and the tripling of crude prices. During the
aftermath of these events a plethora of writing on Japan's
national interest, i.e., her perceived needs and desires in
relation to the other sovereign states in today's world




The underpinning issues of foreign policy that determine
Japan's overall national interest are:
1. economic
:
the enhancement of the one trillion dollar
plus GNP
2. world order : the maintenance of an international
political /economic system in which the vital overseas
trade function remains prosperous
3. ideological : the protection and promotion of the
Japanese system of values
4. defense : the protection of the citizens and the
physical well-being of Japan as a nation-state
These basic national interests, which tended to be
separate concerns from 1945-75, are now linked in a web of
cross cutting interdependencies and changes in their
priorities continue to transpire. In assessing the levels of
intensity of these basic interests, the Japanese analyze
their potential policy options examining costs and values
perceived to be involved in coping with the issues at hand
and categorize the differing degrees as:
1. Survival : the very existence of the state is in
jeopardy
2. Vital : a serious threat to Japan's political/economic
well-being
3. Major : trends in the international environment that
may adversely affect Japan's well-being
4. Peripheral : interests of MNC* s/private investment
overseas may be endangered
B. NUECHTERLEIN AND RESOURCES
To illustrate how policymakers in Japan may use these
various categories/intensities, application of the
Nuechterlein national interest matrix becomes a useful tool
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[Ref 51]. When adapting this model to Japan's resource
dependency problem, the following chart can be hypothesized:
Country: Japan Issue: Resource Dependency
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest










Viewed from the Japanese perspective, government
officials are convinced that the country can continue to play
a forceful foreign economic role without playing any direct
part in global defense. Through active promotion of overseas
aid (ODA), steady cooperation via investment (DFI) in the
developing countries, the establishment of joint ventures and
accompanying technology transfer, it is the consensus in
Japan that they can remain complementary to the defense role
being played by the US in Asia and NATO in Europe. By
stimulating growth in the market economies and assisting
development in the LDC/NIC's, Japan can continue to pursue
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its brand of economic diplomacy in a valuable and distinctive
way, thus ensuring a favorable atmosphere for the growing
interdependence in the world-order of the 1980s. Indeed the
recent Suzuki /Sakurauchi (Foreign Ministry Secretary)
speeches reflect this evolution:
The peace and security of a nation cannot be ensured
by simply beefing up defense potential. To preserve peace,
it is necessary that Japan, which depends on overseas
sources for most of its resources, energy, food and other
needs, establish a comprehensive security policy for
carrying out all policies through coordination [Prime
Minister Z. Suzuki, 25 June 82; Ref 52].
Economic cooperation is not only Japan's
responsibility to international society, but forms an
important link in Japan's comprehensive security policy.
From this point of view, Japan will continue to increase
its aid to areas important to the maintenance of world
peace and security. In order for Japan to play its role as
an important member of the community of nations, it is
particularly important to widely introduce the picture of
Japan in its entirety to the world - not only its
political and economic images, but its social and cultural
images as well - and have the community of nations
accurately understand Japan's basic foreign policy and the
ideas that underlie that policy [Foreign Minister
Sakurauchi, 25 Jan 82; Ref 53].
a. Defense
The increased rhetoric in defense/security
related matters emanating from Tokyo in the recent past is
simply the response to a decade of direct and indirect
pressure applied by many international actors - including the
United States and most of the OECD nations - and reflects the
heightened interest that the defense issue has garnered in
Japan. An examination of the current resource importation










































Thai 61, Mai 15, Indo 8
CAN 18, RP16, Aus 11, Zam 7
Zam 43, RP 20
Aus 43, USA 28, CAN 16
PRC 45, SVR 27, S. Afr 14
Aus 45, USA 31, S. Afr 16
Aus 60, Indo 19, Mai 6
S. Afr 81
S. Afr 49
USSR 52, S. Afr 16
S. Afr 40, Rp 20, Indo 15
S. Afr 48, Indo 40, Thai 7
CAN 34, UK/S. Afr 32, Aus 15
Saudi Arabia 33, Indo 16,
UAE 14, Kuwait 13
Sing 26, Indo 16, S. Afr 14
Indo 30, Brun 25,
Abu Dhabi 16
S. Afr 23, UAE 20, Aus 16




Japan's strategic resources for her industrial infrastructure
sail through two nautical choke points: the Straits of Horrauz
and the Straits of Malacca. The the extent that instability
in either of these areas might cause an interruption of the
supply chain fueling this economic machine, Japan has a
legitimate concern for her economic and physical well-being.
The political and military activities of the Persian Gulf and
the ASEAN sovereigns are subjected to continual scrutiny by
many western analysts. But less is known about the
discussions that surely arise behind closed doors in Tokyo
when situations occur such as the attack on a Japanese tanker
off the Philippines in January, 1982 [Ref 54]; questions must
surface which crosscut all four basic interests but the
resulting decisions are sometimes not tacitly understood
until months later. However, recent ODA/DFI policies have
reflected the effects of increased western pressure on Tokyo
for global security assistance:
1. The previously mentioned increase in economic
support for Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt, nations which
have limited natural resources and no real history of
traditional ties to Japan. The 750 million dollars
directed to these three strategically located nations in
1980/81 has acted to reinforce OECD security policies.
2. The revelation that a Japanese construction
project is two thirds complete on the port of Lumut
,
Malaysia; strategically located on the Malaccan Straits,
Lumut will be the largest ASEAN naval facility and
includes buildings, repair facilities, a training complex,
and berthing for the Malaysian Navy (frigates, patrol




That the Japanese economy depends to a vital
degree on the importation of resources is a fact that been
documented in the previous chapters of this study. The
various commodity markets have been subjected to wild
fluctuations during the last three decades as Japan has
pursued its role as a growing economic superpower. But the
constant has indeed been thirty years of solid growth
including the survival of two major oil shocks, achieved by
tightening wages, increasing productivity, and saving energy.
The current decade will present many challenges to Japan as
continued growth will be scaled down (1982 projection: +4.7
percent) and exports will meet increasingly tough resistance
in the face of a global recession. Success has presented
Japan with a unique problem: it has reached the forefront in
so many fields that it is decreasingly able to "borrow"
technology/R&D from others [Ref 56] . Making breakthroughs is
a slow, tedious process and their economy must increasingly
reflect the reality that continued economic progress will
depend greatly on adherence to the rules that global
interdependence dictates.
c. World-Order
The Japanese FY82 budget reflects the tightening
of pursestrings mirrored by all nations; but increases were
authorized in three areas: defense, ODA, and energy
appropriations. With the projected 4.2 billion dollar
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foreign assistance program, there seems no doubt that as the
United States and other OECD donors curb aid, so will Japan's
increasing contributions assume even greater importance. In
addition, a plan to upgrade the quality of its development
assistance and "untie" (by removing expenditure restrictions)
a greater percentage of loans and grants is expected to help
ease the vailed reality that those nations possessing
strategic resources are indeed the recipients of the bulk of
Japanese foreign aid. The planned priority of rural
development aid, agriculture advisory assistance, and the
promotion of small /medium sized businesses is being supported
by increased cooperative private investment (2.4 billion
dollars for the first half of FY81; a 100% increase) [Ref
57] . The large contributions to the Asian and African
Development Banks serve to reinforce this diplomatic
offensive on aid - it is in Japan's best interests to
generate growth and stability in developing countries. Not
often in postwar times has a nation had an opportunity to
demonstrate humanitarian generosity and concern for fellowmen
without investing heavily in arms trade or security
assistance. But Japan surely has the opportunity in this
decade of serving its own interests and those of peace-loving
mankind by continuing to increase its cost-effective,




In due course, it is inevitable that Japan become
more directly involved in the international process of
political consultation. The Sakurauchi quote reflects
intentional movement toward this arena: ..."to have the
community of nations understand Japan's basic foreign policy
and the ideas that underlie it." The promotion of Japanese
social and cultural values and ideals has been slowest of all
basic interests to be broadcast overseas. The pre-1945
"Fortress Japan /Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" label has taken
more than a generation to disappear, especially in Asia. But
despite the tremendous progress registered in foreign
economic policy circles during the last ten years, the
Japanese are often times their own worst ideological enemy:
a. Southeast Asia: openly anouncing support for
ASEAN policies including an economic boycott of Vietnam, yet,
continuing to import massive coal shipments from SRV in 1981
(Table XXV); agreeing to original US requested sanctions of
the Soviet Union due to Afghanistan, yet, dramatically
increasing overall business in Siberia during 1981,
especially in the natural gas, coal, and timber areas.
b. Persian Gulf : taking an active diplomatic
participation including a probable Fall, 1981, intermediary
role between the PLO (Arafat October visit); yet, continuing
to support both sides in the Iran-Iraq War - the latter via
renewed construction/ project starts, the former with an
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unbroken supply support effort via the Soviet Trans-Siberian
Railway (80,000 tons per month) [Ref 58, p 31].
c. Southern Africa ; the offering of huge
increased projects to Black states such as resource poor
Malawi; yet, continuing to increase a flourishing trade
relationship with South Africa and "laundering" lucrative
resource investment (mostly uranium) in the area under the
"Namibia-UK-USA" label [Ref 59]
.
Surely these examples of inconsistently and
unevenly applied foreign policy in the three important
regions studied cause consternation on the part of Japan's
international partners. The facts tend to bare themselves
out when examining the basic interests applied to strategic
resource dependence: the enhancement of Japan's economy is
The fundamental vital interest involved; in order to assure
continued progressive growth in the 1980s, it is necessary
for Japan to promote an open, outward-looking economic system
to ensure free flowing overseas trade. This fact in itself
dictates that a path of internationalism be followed,
especially in the confrontation-plagued regions discussed.
Solid policy decisions must be made, announced, and carried
out or the vulnerable kendo (fencing) posture "happo-
yabure", loosely defined as "defenseless on all sides," could
well become a diplomatic reality for the Japanese.
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C. A 1980s FORECAST
And indeed, vulnerability is today an important factor,
virtually a survival issue in certain resource dependency
scenarios. Consider the following dilemmas:
1. February, 1982, the Japanese aluminum industry: As the
two oil shocks raised the energy cost to onshore smelters
over eightfold in six years, the decision was made to
export plants and produce ingots in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East. The comparative advantage quickly switched to
these labor-rich/energy-rich areas while Japan, the
producer of over 8 percent of the world's aluminum between
1975-80, found itself importing 1,000,000 tons of ingots
in 1980 and importers paid the 9 percent duty on their
overseas Japanese produced goods! Cumulative losses by
major refiners totalled one trillion yen ($4.5 B) in FY80
alone! The resultant slashed output to two thirds capacity
has not prevented world wide falling prices and market
market dumping. But until the world recession resides and
resulting depressed demand is corrected, cutbacks and
losses will continue in an industry that is a key
indicator of Japan's overall economic well-being. And,
hypothetically
:
2. February, 1984, ten years after the International
Energy Agency (IEA) was formed: Oil from the Middle East
is abruptly cut off; the US dependence on Persian Gulf-oil
is now below 10 percent - but Japan still relies on that
region for 60 percent of its crude sourcing. As a loyal
IEA member and leader in the conservation effort, Japan
expects the energy wealthy Americans to honor the Agency
bylaws and share the resulting deficit equitably by
feeding them some US oil; and even beyond that, by
applying the required military muscle to restore order in
the Middle East.
But, will the US public forget the damage done in the
previous six years by Japanese imports and the
accompanying effect on labor and industry? Can Washington
forget the massive deficits in the trade balance between
1980-83? And will our security planners forget the famous
"free-riders" in defense who carved-out the world's second
most productive economy while devoting 1% GNP to her
defense spending?
Viewed in light of the above scenarios, it is little
wonder that the Japanese continue to approach every potential
problem with a feasibility study group, a KEIDANREN-MITI-MOF
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commissioned opinion survey, an LDP faction parley, and a
resultant consensus decision. The top priority with which
the current government assigns to economic issues is evident
in the Prime Minister's recent Cabinet shuffle: Shintaro Abe,
considered a rising star and possibly a future P.M., selected
for MITI head and Joshio Sakurauchi as Foreign Minister, a
businessman with lots of savy in political-economic trade
problem fields. Their proving grounds will surely be the
upcoming June 1982 OECD economic summit and the November '82,
GATT negotiations in Geneva.
D. ASSESSMENT
The preceding two scenarios underscore the dilemma
created by a nation dependent on the importation of over 80
percent of her strategic resources. But these conditions are
survivable in today's increasingly interdependent world.
Japan has methodically prepared for predicaments such as
these and has learned from the oil shocks by pursuing a path
offering: development assistance packaging in the LDC '
s
(including ODA/DFI), long-term contracts and dominant-buyer
positioning (monopsonist ) in raw material commodities, and a
genuine interest in making her foreign aid/investment /joint
ventures work and become effective elements of Japanese
economic policy. At the heart of the pattern of successful
economic adjustments made in the 1970s is the energy
conservation effort, and effort which allowed Japan to enter
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this decade on a relatively firm economic foundation
—
especially in relation to the other OECD members. The
concept of geographic resource diversification has driven
Japan to broaden her markets considerably, thus reducing the
possible effects from a third energy disruption postulated in
scenario #2 above. In addition, despite occasional bold
rhetoric from ASEAN, OPEC, the OAU, and other organizations
from the "South", the chance of any type of jointly applied
sanctions by the resource suppliers in all three regions
discussed is remote at best. Japan's movement into business
relationships with countries outside these regions is growing
and will continue to do so throughout this decade: Mexico
(oil/iron ore/and possibly uranium), China (oil/coal/others),
Australia (all minerals), Alaska (gas and eventually oil),
and the Soviet Union (oil/gas/coal/iron/others).
The Japanese effectively dealt with two major resource
supply emergencies in the last eight years (oil shocks #1/2)
and they are now learning to cope with the prosperity that




JAPAN'S SEARCH FOR A PETROLEUM MNC
In the 1960s it had become apparent that oil would
replace coal as the primary source of energy for the
expanding Japanese economy. This was a special concern to
the Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI)
since Japan relies on foreign sources for 99% of her oil
supplies. By 1960, 74 percent of her oil was provided by
foreign MNC ' s , mostly through five year contractual
agreements. The 1958 formation of the Arabian Oil Company
(AOC) by Taro Yamashita was the first success story in
Japan's search for oil by an wholly-owned Japanese firm.
Yamashita' s contract with Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia (both
nations retained 20% equity in AOC) to drill for oil in the
Neutral Zone is still one of the classic success stories in
petroleum circles today. He convinced the members of
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) to assist in
this expensive business venture and mobilized support from
various industries, utilities, banks, and insurance
companies. With the discovery of oil in 1961, the flow of
crude resulted in making AOC one of the leading independents
in the world; throughout the 1970s they supplied Japan with
10 percent of her oil needs (1979 production continued to run
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at 570,000 barrels/day). But despite Yamashita's singular
impressive success, a full two thirds of Japan's oil supply
remained in the hands of the major multinationals. MITI
officials realized the need to expand local control of crude
sources but firms were short on experience and capital.
Moreover, perhaps in oil above all other raw materials
ventures, the tainted World War II reputation stuck with the
Japanese as they attempted to secure crude supplies in Asia;
the memories of the western oil blockade and the rabid
attempts by Japan to procure oil to fuel their war machine
were still evident two decades later. In 1967 the government
established the Japan Petroleum Development (JPDC) under the
MITI policy guidance. JPDC was authorized to invest and loan
money to firms for overseas oil and gas development. Within
four years oil projects abroad proliferated and 36 companies
had been formed [Ref.ll, p 44] and were searching for oil in
southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America.
Essentially all these ventures were joint development /buffer
stock agreements with the four major trading companies
leading the way (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni, and Itoh).
Though exploration/development efforts had realized massive
growth, marketing and refining interests had been left
largely in the hands of the major foreign MNC * s
.
Shock n
So in the 1974 "shock", as the Mideast crude supplies
dried up, Japan found herself without any downstream refining
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alternative to its equity Asian/African oil; she watched
helplessly as the majors filled orders for crude at home
before securing a supply for the Japanese market - a market
over 70% dependent on Mideast oil. Only government
assistance, in the form of a rapid foreign policy tilt toward
the Arabs, saved Japan from energy collapse. This "shock",
more than anything else, eventually shaped the formation of
Japan's energy policy for the remainder of this century.
Beginning in 1974, the government sought to redefine its
national economic goals. Keidanren and MITI identified a
series of carefully developed program goals designed to
support a 6 to 7 percent annual growth in real national
income. The oil industry played a major role in the scenario
established: a government energy conservation program
designed to permanently reduce the 99% dependence on overseas
oil (80% of energy source) in addition to expansion of coal
development, nuclear, geotherraal, and solar power sources.
Furthermore, heavy energy users, i.e., smelting and aluminum
processing industries, were checked from further onshore
expansion. Recognizing Japan's inescapable dependence of
foreign oil and foreign MNC ' s , the government adopted a
strategy designed to merge Japan's interests with those of
the international oil companies: increased joint





By 1978 there were fifty Japanese oil firms involved in
overseas exploration - providing approximately 9% of Japan's
crude oil needs. This inferior supply position reinforced
Japanese efforts toward dual channel "energy
diversification": broadening the source of crude supplies
geographically while expanding the source of energy utilized
by the nations growing economy. In addition, the emphasis
placed on downstream refining/distribution, as evidenced by
Table A-I, has increased Japan's share of locally refined oil
today to nearly 48 percent. The government push for direct
deal (DD) and government-to-government (GG) contracts has
increased radically in the wake of oil shock #2 - the 1978-
80 tripling of barrel costs due to the Iranian crisis and the
Iran-Iraq war. Initially, the marketing firms descended on
the oil producing countries and made large oil purchasing
agreements out of fear concerning supply problems similar to
1974. However, the concerted efforts of Japanese industry has
recently led to a reduction in crude requirements and a
leveling off of imports at the 3.5 to 4 million barrels daily
figure. As a result, the long-term purchasing agreements made
in 1979/80 for expensive crude has now contributed to Japan's
oversupply problem in 1981. The worldwide oil glut, Japan's
overall successful conservation effort and the drop in yen
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SELECTED JAPANESE OIL COMPANY PERFORMANCE
OCT8Q MAR81
FIRM Profit/loss (US dollars)
Foreign MNC Affiliates:
Nippon Oil $ + 1,200,000
ESSO Standard + 900,000
Mobil Sekiyu + 800,000
Toa Nenryo + 1,800,000
General Sekiyu + 230,000
Japanese Firms:




Idemitsu Kosan - 500,000
Showa Sekiyu - 400,000
Kyushu Sekiyu - 50,000
1980/81 TOTAL LOSSES UP TO 30JUN81: $ - 21,200,000
Source: Financial Times SEP 02, 1981
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In summation, Japanese oil ventures overseas have
completed a full circle in twenty years:
1. A slow but concerted start in the 1960s
2. Rapid expansion after the post 1973 Oil shock
3. And finally, government directed intervention and
control during the present oversupply period
The position of the four international majors who are
directly involved in Japan's oil industry (Shell, Caltex,
Exxon, amd Mobil) remains significant; they continue to
provide almost 50 percent of Japan's crude and will probably
outlast the current sinking spell as local oil companies
drown in the temporary glut. The advantages of diversified
source supplies, balanced capital assets, and depth in




JAPAN'S STRATEGIC STOCKPILING PLAN
Japan's sentiment about national security, a well
publicized topic, has allowed the focus of postwar progress
and growth to dwell on "what's good for the economic health
of Japan." As such, little attention was devoted to
decreasing the growing critical dependence of imported oil
until the 1973 shock. The onshore petroleum industry
retained an "in-house" 45 day reserve for peak demands.
After joining the IE A, Japan enacted the Petroleum
Stockpiling Law (April, 1976) and mandated a 90 day supply as
the target by FY79 . The Japan Petroleum Development
Corporation (JPDC) joined with seven private firms to form
the Niigata Joint Petroleum Stockpiling Company and commenced
construction on a 1.2 million kiloliter tank storage facility
near Niigata. The projected initial figures were in excess
of $8 M for building with most of the outlay coming from MOF
low interest (2%) loans to private concerns [Ref.22].
Shock #2 caused Japan to reaccess its original 90 day
target and the resultant two pronged plan announced in 1979
is currently being pursued:
1. private industry must maintain a 90 day stockpile
(achieved in 1981 due to the glut)
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2. Government (JPDC) will maintain an additional 30M KL
(40 day) storage by the end of FY88
The JPDC has conducted three rounds of feasibility
studies to select six suitable locations for 5MKL facilities.
In 1981 three sites were completed and filled ahead of
schedule (once again due to the glut). But future
construction has slowed due to:
1. environmental concerns (aesthetics and pollution)
2. overloading of petroleum industry in certain locations
(Tokyo Bay, Inland Sea)
3. deficit spending budget problems at MOF
A variety of proposals have been examined by the JPDC;
the original Niigata standard tank designs have given way to
underground tank programs in Kagoshima and Akita, seacoast
land reclamation projects for tank farms near Fukui, and an
approved construction of 7 floating tanks (about 6MKL each)
off Kyushu [Ref .23]
.
While these construction projects are underway, the
Japanese government has established a sea-based stockpile
program by designating certain Very Large Crude Carriers
(VLCC: 150,000 - 300,000 deadweight ton capacity) to moor off
the coast with their crude load onbaord. As of July 1981,
one third (26) of Japanese owned VLCC ' s were participating in
this government funded "seaborne stockpile." Five different
locations around the nation have been designated for a
holding areas for this tanker stockpiling program.
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Due to the increasing emphasis on LNG (now used as energy
source by 65% of households) the Petroleum Storage Law is
under study for a 1982 amendment to designate a mandatory
level for imported LNG/LPG stockpiling. Government funds
will be allocated to private concerns for construction of LNG
holding tanks; the pattern followed in petroleum stockpiling





Mexico is a poor country with a rapidly growing
population of 70 million, extensive unemployment, a
distribution of income and wealth that is among the most
skewed in the world, a large native Indian population that
has yet to be assimilated, and an inefficient, nearly feudal
agricultural sector that employs nearly half of the labor
force but which produces only 10 percent of the GNP yet
receives a mere 6 percent of the national income [Ref. 60],
The most important policy question facing Mexico today is
whether the speedy development of its enourmous petroleum
reserves offers a means for alleviating these serious socio-
economic problems and advancing Mexico's development as a
successful modern nation. In particular, can Mexico use its
oil wealth to finance the capital investments necessary to
transfer large numbers of underemployed workers from the
agricultural sector to more productive jobs in the industrial
and service sector? Where and How does Japan fit in?
Answer: Financial cooperation including ODA/DFI , technology





The relatively low level of trade between Mexico and
Japan in the 1950-60s reflected the rather limited interests
that these two nations shared. Geography worked against a
convenient bilateral economic realt ionship; there was no
large identifiable Japanese colony in Mexico such as the case
of the 800,000 plus group in Brazil; and developed resources,
until the mid 1970s, amounted to only silver, copper, lead,
and manganese in very limited quantities (ie, not a top five
Japanese supply source); as a result, direct investment and
official development assistance prior to 1970 totaled less
than 25 million dollars, even when lumped together. So it
was left mainly to Oil Shock #1 in 1973-74 to bring these two
Pacific Basin states closer together.
The worldwide effect of the Arab boycott on oil exports
has already been documented and discussed; suffice it to say
that two direct after-effects of this traumatic event were:
1. A rejuvenated effort by Mexico to examine her own
pertoleum development which had stagnated between the
nationalization effort (1938) and the "Reforma" oil field
discovery (1974), and, 2. A dedicated and doggedly successful
geographic resource diversification effort by the Japanese
which "re-introduced" them to the Pacific Basin and into





From 1974 to 1980 bilateral trade with Mexico quadrupled
from 470 million dollars to just over 2.1 billion dollars
while Japanese investment jumped from a 1975 figure of 141
million dollars to a respectable 750 million dollars
(Aug. '81), thus, ranking Mexico in the top 12 DFI markets
with 2.3 percent of Tokyo's investment overseas [Ref. 61].
Some KEIDANREN-related private ties had existed prior to this
timeframe (Japan-Mexico Businessmen's Conference, established
in 1961, and the Japan-Mexico business trainee exchange
program, 1971) but in general, the increased interest was due
to Japan's recognition that the oil projections finally
outweighed the concern over the controversial 1973 foreign
investment law which mandated a local 51 percent Mexican
ownership of all joint ventures. In 1976 Pesident Lopez
Portillo relaxed certain facets of this regulation and the
resultant rush by foreign investors was immediate — Japan
ended 1980 with a 6 percent share of Mexico's total overseas
investment. This effort has assisted both nations: President
Portillo is attempting to reduce dependence on US investment
sources and the increasing Japanese/OECD interest has
promoted this goal (US private investment declined to 68% of
the total in 1980) [Ref. 62].
In addition to the obvious natural resource interests,
Mexico offers access to three large markets: a local rapidly
growing domestic market and the geographical proximity of
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easy-access to both the US and the expanding central American
marketplaces. The Southeast Asian pattern of plant exports
for machinery, electronics, and even automobile assembly is
gaining in appeal as several Japanese factories have been
established, many along the Mexican-US border during the last
four years. The labor market is both cheap and plentiful and
the northern border offers immediate access to the US market.
Combined with the abundant energy supply, these factories can
run efficiently and relatively cheaply, thus improving the
Mexican-Japanese comparative advantage.
The Pacific Basin Angle
The 1977 Campeche Bay discovery boosted Mexico's proved
reserves past the 70 billion barrel mark, even by the most
conservative estimate. Only Saudi Arabia has more confirmed
crude and Mexico has already far exceeded any Persian Gulf
states' s gas reserve with a 1981 estimate in excess of 100
trillion cubic feet [Ref. 63]. This combination of energy
reserves has clearly been Mexico's ticket to development.
After extending a small Export-Import Bank loan to improve
the silver export facilities at Manzanillo, Japan began to
concentrate on other Pacific ports to help accelerate
Mexico's Pacific Basin development program. The lion's share
of Japanese DFI/ODA/and technological assistance over the
last five years has gone into the Pacific industrial port
complexes at Salina Cruz and Lazaro Cardenas. Every aspect of
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the transportation infrastructure has been aided by Japanese
participation
:
1. Bulk loading docks/containerization facilities
2. General cargo warehouse improvements
3. Railroad terminal modernization
4. Roads/bridge construction on feeder routes
5. Oil pipeline extension/pumping terminals
The Japanese see these two ports as the key to economic
development of Mexico as a Pacific Basin state. In addition,
by improving the inland transportation links to these ports,
Japan acts in both her own and Mexico's best interests.
Hence, the increased investment emphasis in 1980/81 on the
"landbridge" across the 180 mile Isthmus of Tehuantepee; this
proposed project will link the oil-rich Gulf coast port of
Coatzacoalcoa with Salina Cruz— by rail, by highway, and by
oil pipeline. Lazaro Cardenas, once a jungle town, is now
the rapidly growing home of Sumitomo Steel and the Sicartsa
tube mill project. Much of the planned 10 million ton per
year output (by 1990) will be used to beef up this port
facility and produce pipeline tools and equipment [Ref.64].
The Oil for Technology Angle
The October, 1977, formal request from the Mexican
government to Japan for financial development assistance in
exchange for crude oil deliveries prefaced the worsening
crisis in Iran. The first written contract guarantee was
transacted in February, 1978, by three firms in Tokyo (the
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Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsuibishi, and Mitsui) and the
Mexicn Petroleum Company (PEMEX) : 65 million dolar loan
credits for pipeline and port improvements in the Gulf in
exchange for an export guarantee of 25,000 barrels per day.
Japan had depended on Iran for 17 percent of its oil and was
anxious to diversify in the early days of Oil Shock #2. An
endless string of official trips across the Pacific began in
1979 as both sides tried to agree on industrial projects and
oil export totals. After two years of continuous
deliberations, the following milestones fall out
chronologically: ( FBIS , Latin America/Asia)
a. November 1978, Lopez Portillo secures 1.1 billion
dollar package of credits and technology assistance in
agriculture (soybeans, corn, beef) while on a state visit
to Tokoyo
b. July 1979, 300 million dollars extended to PEMEX
for gas pipeline development; Foreign Minister Sonoda
secures guarantee to increase oil exports to 100,000 bpd
effective September 1980.
c. March 1980, Mexican trade delegation receives
direct investment guarantee of 2.1 billion dollars for
steel development between 1981-85.
d. April 1980, Keidanren president requests increase
to 200,000 bpd during tour of Japanese projects in Mexico.
PEMEX agrees to move up earlier increase by three months
and will "consider future increases."
e. May 1980, Prime Minister Ohira asks for 300,000
bpd in exchange for a 200 million dollar credit line in
1981; and official visit to Mexico ends less than a month
before his sudden death.
f. December 1980, Prime Minister Suzuki offers
Mexico the largest untied loan ever provided by Japan
(outside of ASEAN) - 700 million dollars - to solidify the
oil export increase requested by Ohira.
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g. January 1981, MITI head Rokusuke Tanaka secures
Pres. Portillo's promise "to increase Japanese oil exports
as early as possible, but not earlier than 1982; Tanaka
extends soft loan of 125 million dollars for "unspecified
purposes.
"
h. June 1981, Suzuki visits Mexico and solidifies
increased oil imports "up to 300,000 bpd in late 1982" in
exchange for technological assistance in refining plants
and steel mills along with the already promised loan
credits.
i. July 1981, Foreign Minister Sonoda changes
Japanese tune and tells Mexicans that due to the oil glut,
no increase from the 100,000 bpd total will be requested
in 1982 by the Japanese.
j. November 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki appoints
Kiyoaki Kikuchi to be new Ambassador to Mexico — a 35
year Foreign Ministry veteran and former head of the
Economic Cooperation Bureau.
The pattern of further Japanese investment, increased
trade, and closer relations between these two Pacific Basin
nations has continued to prove out during the last six
months: Nissan Motors announced auto plant expansion plans
totaling 400 million dollars in the next five years, Nippon
steel received a 225 million dollar order for the Sicartsa
project, Hitachi joined with a West German steel company to
win the expansion contract at Sicartsa, and Mitsubishi agreed
to deliver four steam turbines ($45 million) to the Federal
Electric Company for a new power station [Ref. 65].
Outlook
1982 promises to be a difficult year for Mexico: the
oil glut has created complex economic problems for the
world's oil-rich and oil-poor alike. Increased production
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seems to lead to worsening inflation and the 1981 28 percent
figure is already higher than Miguel de la Madrid, the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) selection for
Mexico's next President (Dec '82-88), would like to inherit.
A conservative Harvard trained economist /technocrat , Sr.
Madrid is expected to continue to seek diversified investment
sources from a variety of nations abroad. The Portillo 1981
economic plan boosted employment ( 1,000,000 jobs),
agricultural output ( 7%), the overall growth rate ( 8%),
and, inevitably, the public debt ( $500M) [Ref. 66], But
with the expected "slowdown" forecast for 1982-83 (4-5%
growth), it will be in Mexico's best interests, and Japan's
as well, to continue to pursue increased ties across the
Pacific. For example:
Advantages for the Mexicans:
1. Allows further development of the economically
stagnant Pacific coast: jobs, infrastructure improvements,
factories, and other projects, all of which will lead to
improvement of Mexico's access while facilitating
business/trade with all Pacific Basin Nations
2. Underlines the obvious fact that the Japanese
have refined technology in industries that Mexico is
seeking to develop: electronics, steel, automobiles,
fishing, and agriculture
3. Results in the windfall realization that
increased Japanese business further reduces traditional
dependence on US investment funds, thereby allowing
economic diversification for Mexican interests
Advantages for the Japanese
1. Allows futher development of the Pacific Basin,
now Japan's #1 marketplace
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2. Offers a non-OPEC alternative to future oil /gas
supplies by a nation which needs Japanese
technology /investment
3. Complements US policy in Latin America: economic
development assistance in Mexico assists the search for
stability and prosperity of a democratic Latin America,
thereby demonstrating support for another Pacific friend
— the United States,
Mexico's long-term economic health will be determined
by a variety of factors, not the least of which will be the
stability of the world's oil production and price. Now, in
the immediate post boom years (1981-85), financial experts
are predicting a slowdown and consolidation of the fabulous
gains that Mexico made during the Portillo years. But one
thing is certain: renewed growth and expansion will most
definitely occur. And the Japanese are deeply involved in
assisting this growing Pacific partner. Truly, the rising
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